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INTRODUCTION
The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics directed a lawyer to "obey his own
conscience."' Lawyers receive similar advice today. Writings on legal practice
encourage lawyers to make professional decisions based on their moral values2
and religious beliefs,3 as expressed in the familiar injunction: to be charted by
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1. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmICS Canon 15 (1908) ("The office of attorney does not permit, much less
does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client."); see also id. Canon 32 (stating that the lawyer "advances the honor of his
profession and the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon
the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law").
Nineteenth-century compilations of professional norms were particularly emphatic that the lawyer may act
according to personal conscience. See DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDIES (2d ed. 1836) ("My
client's conscience, and my own, are distinct entities: . .. I shall ever claim the privilege of solely judging to
what extent to go."), in THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION Topics
64 (1985); Alabama State Bar Ass'n, CODE OF ETHICS, 118 Ala. Reports xxiii (1899) ("The attorney's office does
not destroy the man's accountability to the Creator .... The client cannot be made the keeper of the attorney's
conscience in professional matters."), in SHAFFER, supra, at App. 1-33, App. 1-35; see generally THOMAS L.
SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 6-7 (1981) (noting that professional opinion in the nineteenth
century reflected "a vehement denial of the idea that a lawyer may suspend his conscience").
2. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, JR., The Life of the Law: Values, Commitment, and Craftsmanship, 100
HARv. L. REv. 795, 815 (1987) ("To paraphrase Justice Holmes, the life of the law must not be mere logic; it
must also be values."); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 59 (1994) (discussing moral values of client and lawyer as "a starting place ... from which
moral understanding can grow").
3. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Introduction to Faith and the Law Symposium, 27 TEx. TECH L. REv. 925,
925-26 (1996) (noting that, as legal practitioners make more obvious the connections between their own faith
and their work, "the law increasingly will be infused with the rich ethical insights that have been a principal
product of America's religious traditions"); Mark E. Chopko, Public Lives and Private Virtue, 27 TEX. TECH L.
REv. 1035, 1039-40 (1996) (urging lawyers to strive to acknowledge and incorporate private values in their
public lives); Teresa Stanton Collett, To Be a Professing Woman, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1051, 1051-52 (1996)
(encouraging a practice of law as an expression of our love of God and pursuit ofjustice); THOMAS L. SHAFFER &
MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 198 (1991)
(discussing a "theological proposition" as one in which the lawyer's occupation is "consistent with [his or] her
life in the church"). But see Marc D. Stem, The Attorney as Advocate and Adherent: Conflicting Obligations of
Zealousness, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1363, 1370 (1996) (arguing that a religious lawyer must "separate his
wishes as a member of a religious community from his role as dispassionate advocate for a client").
For purposes of this Article, no effort is made either to define precisely what is meant by "personal moral"
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one's own "moral compass." 4 Underlying this advice is an assumption about the
professional norms - namely, that they accommodate, if not contemplate,
lawyers' reliance on personal values. This assumption finds some support in the
contemporary codes of lawyer conduct, which acknowledge a role for the
lawyer's "conscience" or "moral judgment."5
Yet, it is open to question whether the legal profession's contemporary norms
assign a leading role to lawyers' personal values or merely a bit part. And
surprisingly, given the centrality of this question, the legal literature addresses it
only peripherally. 6 This Article responds by examining in detail how the legal
profession's norms both accommodate and limit lawyers' reliance on their own
beliefs and "religious" beliefs or to draw a precise line between them. In general, the article addresses"religious" beliefs about right and wrong conduct that are derived from one's understanding of God's will
and/or the precepts of one's particular religious affiliation. "Personal moral" beliefs refer to other beliefs that
one holds about right and wrong conduct that is not identified with such a source.
4. See, e.g., Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 527, 530
(1994) ("The foundations for the qualities necessary to the lawyer's craft lie in character traits and deep
knowledge that one would not characterize as 'skills' at all - personal integrity, an inner moral compass, and a
perception of one's work as embedded in broad social, economic, political, historical, and for some, spiritual
contexts."); Robert J. Muise, Note, Professional Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers: The Judgment of
Conscience, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771, 798 (1996) ("In order to choose the proper course, a Catholic must
follow his moral conscience. A Catholic's moral conscience is his ethical compass - 'calling him to love and to
do what is good and to avoid evil.' ") (quoting familiar Christian maxim).
5. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] ("The Code
of Professional Responsibility points the way to the aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the
transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to
which his actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect
and confidence of the members of his profession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a
lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucr pmbl. (as amended Aug. 1994) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("Within the framework of these Rules
many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.").
6. The question of what role the legal profession's norms contemplate that personal values should play in
professional decisionmaking lies at the crossroads of three areas of academic concern in addition to legal ethics.
The first is clinical legal studies. See David R. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory
and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 74-75 (1979) (envisioning clinical law courses as a crucible within
which personal values and ethics would be explored). The second is the study of the role of religion in lawyers'
professional life, an area to which Thomas L. Shaffer has given prominence. E.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Christian
Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 721 (1975). The third is moral philosophy.
Although moral philosophers have focused on the relationship between common morality and professional
norms, see infra notes 11-12 (citing scholarship exploring the relationship between common morality and
professional morality), a prominent exception is Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional
Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63, 68 (1980) (addressing "the conflict between private and professional moralities").
Postema argues that the "standard conception of the lawyer's role" is marked by the central ideals of
"partisanship" and "neutrality," which call for a sharp separation of "private and professional morality.... The
good lawyer leaves behind his own family, religious, political, and moral concerns, and devotes himself to the
client." Id. at 73, 75, 78. Postema advocates an alternative conception, in which lawyers would integrate their
own "sense of moral responsibility into the role." Id. at 82. He responds to various possible objections,
including that his alternative conception is unnecessary because lawyers adequately can express their moral
judgments through decisions about whether to begin or end a lawyer-client relationship. Id. at 84-85. He fails,
however, to anticipate an objection suggested by this Article - namely, that Postema vastly exaggerates the
extent to which the existing professional norms require lawyers to distance themselves from personal moral
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moral and religious understandings. In so doing, it challenges both those who
assume that personal and professional values generally can be integrated 7 and
those who assume that professional norms eclipse personal conscience.
After describing various claims concerning how a lawyer's personal values
may influence professional decisionmaking, this Article challenges the most
robust claim, namely, that the professional norms contemplate that personal
values may play a role in all professional decisionmaking and, therefore, lawyers
can be accountable to their consciences in all aspects of their professional lives.
The Article explores the extent to which lawyers actually may act on the basis of
personal moral and religious beliefs while also claiming to conform with
professional norms. It demonstrates how particular beliefs, especially highly
specific ones, often must be excluded from central aspects of lawyers' profes-
sional work. Finally, the Article identifies some implications of this tension
between professional norms and personal moral values both for the legal
profession and for individual lawyers.
I. How PERSONAL VALUES MAY INFLUENCE PROFESSIONAL DECISIONMAKING
At first, the question of whether a lawyer may base professional decisions on
personal moral or religious values appears to be simply a variation of Charles
Fried's question, "Can a good lawyer be a good person?" 8 Fried's question about
the relationship between professional norms and personal morals has engendered
much discussion 9 and, indeed, has been characterized by Robert Lawry as the
concerns and that, insofar as the professional norms exclude private morality, there is often a moral basis for
doing so that does not derive from a principle of neutral partisanship.
7. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship
and Profession, 27 Thx. ThCH L. REv. 1199, 1207, 1209 (1996) ("As a prosecutor, I thus have the obligation and
opportunity to integrate many of my religious and professional goals.").
8. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060, 1060 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REv. 853, 854 (1992)
(asking the fundamental question of whether a good person can be a good lawyer); Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers,"
"Good Lawyers, " and "Legal Ethics," 81 GEO. L.J. 2533, 2538 (1993) (discussing the contradiction between
being a good lawyer who advocates for a bad client and being a good lawyer who is a good person); Timothy W.
Floyd, Realism, Responsibility, and the Good Lawyer: Niebuhrian Perspectives on Legal Ethics, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 587, 590 (1992) (discussing the works of David Luban and William Simon that focus on the
lawyer's responsibility to refuse to assist clients in wrongdoing); Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility
in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 191, 192 (1978) (discussing the importance of questioning
whether professionalism and human decency are incompatible and setting forth the related question of whether
it is the lawyer who bears the responsibility of exercising control in the attorney-client relationship); Sanford
Levinson, National Loyalty, Communalism, and the Professional Identity of Lawyers, 7 YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
49, 52 (1995) (arguing that Fried's question whether a good lawyer can be a good person is too broad and,
instead, posing an adapted version of the question asking whether a good lawyer, as defined by adherence to the
norms of professional conduct, can be a good citizen); DAVID LuaAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY
109 (1988) (considering Fried's question in the context of role morality); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's
Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614
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issue "that is truly at the heart of the moral inquiry into the ethics of lawyers."' 0
The moral inquiry into lawyers' ethics traditionally has focused on how the
professional norms relate to" - and, particularly, conflict with - moral
principles that are common (very widely shared), universal (binding upon every
person and every community), and fundamental (of utmost importance and
addressing basic questions). ' 2 In practice, however, professional morality rarely
(explaining that there is no moral justification for the accepted standard that lawyers, in representing clients, are
judged by a different standard than are laypersons); Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional
Responsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHics 286, 287 (David Luban ed.,
1983) (suggesting that it is not possible to separate questions concerning the responsibilities of lawyers from
those questions considered by individuals contemplating a career in lawyering - namely, whether a good
person can be a good lawyer); Thomas L. Shaffer, Christian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics, 33
MERCER L. REV. 877, 880 (1982) (considering whether a good person can be a good lawyer through an analysis
of the character Atticus Finch in the screenplay of To Kill a Mockingbird). But see William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1113-19 (1988) (asserting that, in most cases, when writers
identify what purports to be a conflict between legal and nonlegal moral commitments, the conflict is really
between competing legal values).
10. Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 312 n.5 (1990).
11. Among the writings in this area are those arguing that lawyers should be required to act in accordance
with particular moral principles that the author believes to be uncontested or worthy of universal acceptance.
See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 58 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing concept of
independence as a limit on loyalty to client); Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client
Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990) (arguing
that the rules of professional conduct should require lawyers to counsel clients in accordance with specified
moral considerations); Simon, supra note 9, at 1083 (arguing that lawyers should act based on the principle of
promoting justice).
12. See, e.g., David J. Luban, Introduction to THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 9, at I ("The authors ...
address the fundamental problems of legal ethics: does the professional role of lawyers impose duties that are
different from, or even in conflict with, common morality?"); David Luban, ed., THE ETHics OF LAWYERS Xiii
(1994) ("The problematic aspect of lawyers' ethics, however, consists in duties (such as demolishing the
truthful witness) that contradict rather than supplement everyday morality."); Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE,
supra note 9, at 108 (referring to "conflicts between role morality and a universal morality"); id. at 110
("Common morality is not contingently universal: it is universal because it applies to persons simplicitur.");
Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 9, at 32 (referring to the
"incompatibility or tension between roles and universalistic demands of morality"); Bernard Williams,
Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in ThE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 9, at 259 ("[I]t is the possibility of
a divergence between professional morality and 'ordinary' or 'everyday' morality that lends particular interest
to the notion of a professional morality."); Susan Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law, in THE
GOOD LAWYER, supra note 9, at 38, 57 ("[I]t is perhaps inevitable that even the best intraprofessional legal
standards will on rare occasions conflict with fundamental moral requirements.").
Keeping the focus on common morality is one way of reconciling two possibly conflicting impulses. The first
impulse is to mistrust the personal morality of most lawyers for any of several reasons. At best, one might
question whether lawyers can claim expertise in dealing with moral questions. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, On
Professional Prerogatives, 37 STAN. L. REV. 459, 463 (1985) (expressing doubt as to whether lawyers possess
superior expertise regarding questions of right and wrong). At worst, lawyers may be suspected not simply of
moral neutrality, but of sympathy for clients' morally questionable values, or of moral views that are distorted
by legal training and experience. Cf. Mark Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional Autonomy: Reflections on
Corporate Lawyering and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 139, 150 (1987)
(observing that "lawyers' preoccupation with rules and procedural regularity may lead to a one-sided view of
morality"). But see Thomas L. Shaffer, Less Suffering When You're Warned: A Response to Professor Lewis, 38
CAm. U. L. REv. 871, 873 (1989) (arguing that "what makes the lawyer-client relationship a moral enterprise"
is "that the lawyer has character, wisdom, and moral integrity"). The second impulse is to favor moral activism.
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will conflict with common moral norms, because so-called "ethical" or "moral"
obligations are reflected in the rules of professional conduct just as other aspects
of the "law of lawyering" are strongly rooted in common morality.13
The question at the heart of this Article - namely, what relationship exists
between professional norms and personal values and beliefs that are not com-
monly shared - is less interesting from the moral philosophers' perspective, but
significant for practitioners. Professional norms more frequently will conflict
with unique individual moral codes than with a concept of morality more
common to society. Additionally, the arguments for allowing lawyers to act in
accordance with moral principles that conflict with professional norms will apply
Cf Robert A. Kagan & Robert L. Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 399, 409-10 (1985) (discussing image of corporate lawyers as independent counselors who give advice
referring "not only to specific rules of black-letter law, but also to general principles of equity, fair dealing, and
public policy" and who "play[] a crucial role in pushing businesses toward socially responsible behavior"). As
one would scarcely encourage lawyers to act in furtherance of personal values that are deemed questionable,
however, the effort must be made to identify a limited set of moral values that are an aspect of common morality
in furtherance of which lawyers may be encouraged to act.
13. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLiAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr § 101 at lix (Supp. 1993) (explaining the overlap between legal and
moral elements of the law of lawyering); William E. Nelson, Moral Ethics, Adversary Justice, and Political
Theory: Three Foundations for the Law of Professional Responsibility, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911, 917-18
(1989) (noting that various moral ethics are the source of professional standards); Maura Strassberg, Taking
Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, IOWA L. REV. 901,949 (1995) ("[C]odifica-
tions such as the Model Code or Model Rules must be interpreted in light of embedded moral and political
principles."); Wolf, supra note 12, at 45 (stating that the moral constraints on how a lawyer may act on behalf of
a client "are simply the ordinary moral constraints that are generally recognized to attach directly to any activity
in the absence of special exception"). But see Andreas Eshete, Does a Lawyer's Character Matter?, in THE
GOOD LAWYER, supra note 9, at 270, 274 (identifying aspects of "[e]ffective adversarial advocacy on behalf of a
criminal defendant [that are] unacceptable from a moral point of view").
A similarly close relationship between the legal profession's norms and religious thought can be expected,
given the impact of religious understandings on areas of thought that would seem far less susceptible. For
example, in May 1997, the Center for Theology and Natural Sciences hosted an international conference at
which some participants concluded that contemporary cosmology had been influenced, if only subconsciously,
by scientists' cultural and religious traditions. See Margaret Wertheim, God is also a Cosmologist, N.Y TIMEs,
June 8, 1997, § 4, at 16 (discussing compatibility of natural science and religious faith). This conclusion was
considered so notwithstanding that physical observations limit how one conceptualizes the universe. Id.
Lawyers would seem to have far greater leeway to construct professional norms than scientists have to construct
theories about the universe.
As a possible reflection of this relationship, particular professional norms sometimes have been equated with
biblical injunctions. For example, the injunction against "serving two masters" might be cited as an antecedent
of the obligation to avoid conflicts of interest, while the injunction to avoid the "appearance of evil" might be
cited as an antecedent of the obligation to avoid the "appearance of impropriety." See Monroe H. Freedman,
Legal Ethics from a Jewish Perspective, 27 TEx. ThCH L. REv. 1131, 1134 (1996 ) (discussing more generally
what he believes to be the Jewish sources for themes that motivate his philosophy of lawyers' ethics). Along
these lines, it might be worth exploring the extent to which the professional norms are rooted in the particular
religious understandings of mid-nineteenth century figures, such as George Sharswood, whose work shaped the
contemporary norms, along the lines of Russell Pearce's study of the relationship between Sharswood's work
and his political philosophy. See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 241 (1992) (referring to the work of nineteenth-century jurist and scholar
George Sharswood as the original source of modem legal ethics codes).
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with less force when the particular moral principles are non-conventional.' 4
Thus, these individual conflicts are less easily avoided through creative interpre-
tations of the professional norms, and the individual's moral justification for
flatly disregarding the professional norms will be far weaker.
One can conceptualize the relationship between professional norms and
personal values in various ways. At one extreme, it might be thought that the
professional norms require the complete exclusion of personal values from
lawyers' professional decisionmaking"5 - or, in Sanford Levinson's words, that
they require "the 'bleaching out' of merely contingent aspects of the self,
including the residue of particularistic socialization that we refer to as our'conscience.' "16 Levinson has been read to envision " 'bleaching out' [as] the
standard conception of the lawyer's professional role." 17
Lawyers and academics have posited, however, a number of alternative
conceptions that permit personal moral and religious understandings to inform or
influence a lawyer's work to varying degrees. To begin with, Geoffrey Hazard has
noted that a lawyer's "subjective religious and personal moral predispositions"
are part of "[t]he lawyer's normative milieu." 18 Azizah al-Hibri also has
suggested "that religion subconsciously informs our individual professional
practice."' 9 This view essentially places religious or moral understandings in the
background, but not entirely offstage.
Others have suggested that lawyers should be alerted to the possible impropri-
14. See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (suggesting that professional norms may be presump-
tively deficient when they conflict with common morality, but not when they conflict with an individual's
non-conventional values).
15. See SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, supra note 1, at 7 (characterizing "the principle of
suspended conscience" as an aspect of "the dominant adversary ethics").
16. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional
Identity, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1577, 1578 (1993); see also Judith L. Maute, Foreword to Symposium: The
Evolving Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993) ("Years of practice tend to
toughen one's moral sensibilities, with the result being that very little causes moral discomfort.").
Levinson identifies this view with the writings of Monroe Freedman, as captured by Freedman's observation
that " 'mak[ing] each lawyer's conscience his ultimate guide ... is wholly inconsistent with the notion of
professional ethics, which, by definition, supersede personal ethics.' " Levinson, supra, at 1578 (quoting
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1482 n.26 (1966)). Freedman subsequently argued persuasively, however,
that the phrase was lifted out of context to exemplify a view that he does not in fact hold. See Freedman, supra
note 13, at 1135-38 ("In view of the previous discussion, it should be clear why I was taken aback when I
learned that I am being used, or misused, by Professor Sanford Levinson as representing those lawyers whose
religious identity and personal ethics have been 'bleached out' by their professional ethics.") (footnote omitted).
17. Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson, 14 CARDOZo L.
REv. 1613, 1627 (1993) (referring to "bleaching out" as the standard view of the lawyer's professional role with
regard to devotion to the rule of law); see also Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEx. TECH
L. REV. 1259, 1261 (1996) (citing Levinson's view that the professional project of law "bleaches out" such
aspects of the self as one's conscience).
18. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Equal Opportunity in the Practice of Law, 27 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 127, 128
(1990) ("The lawyer's normative milieu includes norms of work setting, family and community, and subjective
religious and personal moral predispositions.").
19. Azizah al-Hibri, On Being a Muslim Corporate Lawyer, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 947,961 (1996).
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ety of proposed conduct and prompted to seek further guidance when their
conduct clashes with the lawyer's personal sense of morality.20 A comparably
modest "watchdog" role might be assigned to the lawyer's religious understand-
ings. The point is not that one's moral or religious understandings have some
direct relevance to how one ultimately resolves a question about how to act.
Rather, these understandings simply may alert the lawyer to the existence of such
a question, presumably because professional norms sometimes coincide with
one's personal values.
Ultimately, it seems clear that a lawyer's religious and moral under-
standings may be brought to bear on at least some decisions that the
lawyer makes. For example, a lawyer generally may rely on these under-
standings in deciding whom not to represent, 21 as Monroe Freedman 22 and
20. See, e.g., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 204-05 (July 1992)
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT] ("Primary sources of ethical rules include [a] lawyer's personal sense of
morality, particularly to the extent that it causes the lawyer to... [q]uestion and research the ethical propriety of
practices before employing them (including practices urged upon the lawyer by a supervisor or practices long
accepted by lawyers within the particular field of practice) [and qiuestion and seek guidance with regard to
practices that are not addressed by existing roles or the opinions interpreting them."); American Bar Association
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, TEACING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 12 (Aug.
1996) ("When students who have completed a solid ethical program enter a law school, they are likely to be
more sensitized to the ethical and professional responsibility issues which will face them for the rest of their
lives."); see also Charles W. Wolfram, Legal Ethics and the Restatement Process - The Sometimes-
Uncomfortable Fit, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 13, 13 (1993) ("Considerations of 'legal ethics,' for example, are
concerned with personal ethics - the aspects of a life scheme which, at any moment, an actor employs to assess
whether what she is doing as a lawyer is appropriate.").
21. While lawyers have a professional duty to accept court appointments, MODEL RULES Rule 6.2, in most
cases they have absolute discretion to refuse to represent prospective clients who seek to retain them. See id.
cmt. ("A lawyer is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant."). In
contrast, lawyers' discretion in deciding whom to represent is bounded. Initially, this discretion presupposes the
prospective client's willingness to retain the lawyer. (An obvious exception is in the case of court-appointed
representation.) Then, the lawyer's decision is limited by, among other professional norms, the duty to avoid
conflicts of interest, id. Rule 1.7, and the duty not to undertake work for which the lawyer is unqualified and
incapable of becoming qualified. Id. Rule 1.1.
22. I credit Monroe Freedman, in part, because he has been identified in the professional literature with a
philosophy of legal ethics - characterized by Postema as a philosophy of "neutral partisanship," see supra
note 6 (discussing Postema's argument) - that is often thought to leave little role for lawyers' personal values.
See supra note 16 (noting Levinson's identification of Freedman's writings with a philosophy of moral
neutrality. Freedman has long urged the importance of moral counseling, see infra note 104 (discussing
Freedman's views on moral counseling), and has attributed his professional philosophy to his Jewish religious
values. See infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Freedman's views on legal ethics from a Jewish
perspective). Further, Freedman has consistently argued that, as a general rule, decisions about which clients to
represent are exclusively for the lawyer to decide, and that these decisions should be morally justifiable. See,
e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS at 49, 57 (1990) ("In short, a lawyer should
indeed have the freedom to choose clients on any standard he or she deems appropriate. As Professor Fried
points out, the choice of client is an aspect of the lawyer's free will, to be exercised within the realm of the
lawyer's moral autonomy."); Monroe Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. LEGAL ED. 55, 56
(1991) ("Except in the unusual circumstances of a court appointment, the lawyer is unconstrained by ethical
rules in her choice of areas of practice, causes, and clients .... [A] lawyer's choice of client or cause is a moral
decision that should be weighed as such by the lawyer and that the lawyer should be prepared to justify to
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others23 have argued. Additionally, many decisions about one's professional life
that are unrelated to the lawyer-client representation may be based on these
understandings. For example, the legal profession's ethical norms give no
direction to a lawyer about how respectfully to treat others within one's law firm,
what balance to strike between devotion to work and devotion to family, or how
to decorate one's office. A lawyer therefore is free to answer these questions
(within legal limits) based on personal moral or religious understandings. 24
Further, personal moral or religious beliefs may inform a lawyer's understand-
ing of the professional norms in general. Addressing legal ethics from a Jewish
perspective, Freedman has written that his philosophy of lawyers' ethics is
motivated by themes with Jewish sources: "the dignity and sanctity of the
individual, compassion for fellow human beings, individual autonomy, and equal
protection of the laws," implicit in all of which is "a pervasive ethic of warm zeal
in the client's behalf.", 25 In the same volume, from a Christian perspective, Dan
Edwards has written:
The common assumption that law practice and Christian practice are incompat-
ible rests on misconceptions of both practices. The proper practice of law is not
unrestrained advocacy for hire, but rather faithful advocacy and counsel
grounded in a commitment to obtaining the goods of justice, mercy, reconcilia-
tion, peace, and liberty for one's client.26
These philosophies of law practice sound very different, and may reflect very
different approaches to the representation of clients, yet there is nothing in the
Model Rules, for example, to say that either is wrong. Thus, because of the porous
nature of the professional norms, one's general philosophical approach to the
practice of law may be determined by one's personal moral or religious under-
standings.
While this approach assigns a far more significant role to personal morality or
others."); Monroe Freedman, The Morality of Lawyering, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at 22 ("[Tlhe lawyer
has the broadest power - ethically and in practice - to decide which clients to represent" and "the lawyer's
decision to accept or to reject a particular client is a moral decision."); Monroe Freedman, Must You Be the
Devil's Advocate?, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 23, 1993, at 19 ("[L]awyers have always been free to choose whether to
represent particular clients" and "the question of whether to represent a particular client can present the lawyer
with an important decision for which the lawyer is morally accountable.").
23. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 10.2.2 (1986) (stating that a lawyer
generally may refuse to represent a client for moral or other reasons). But see Charles W. Wolfram, A
Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients, Repugnant and Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 9, at 214,215
(raising "a substantial doubt that a lawyer never is obliged to accept a case of a repugnant client").
24. See, e.g., Joseph G. Allegretti, Neither Curse Nor Idol: Towards a Spirituality of Work for Lawyers, 27
TEX. TECH L. REV. 963, 973-74 (1996) (discussing how the author relied on friends and family to help him
balance his work and home life).
25. Freedman, supra note 13, at 1134; see also id. at 1131 ("In two books and several dozen law review
articles, I have argued for a coherent system that recognizes that lawyers' ethics must be rooted in the
Constitution, specifically, in the Bill of Rights. That is, of course, consistent with Jewish tradition.").
26. Dan Edwards, Reflections on Three Stories: "Practicing "Law and Christianity at the Same Tune, 27 Thx. TEC
L. REv. 1105, 1112 (1996); see also Shaffer, supra note 6, at 722-723 (relating Christian values to the Model Code).
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religion, it is not to say that all professional decisions, or even most, are
compatible with one's moral or religious views. Yet, a more robust claim about
the role of personal values in professional decisionmaking is reflected in recent
discussions of the work of religious lawyers. For example, in discussing Judaism
as a constitutive aspect of professional practice for Orthodox Jewish lawyers,27
Levinson provided several examples of how Halakhic commands might apply to
the lawyer's work, not only with respect to the selection of clients, but also with
respect to the advice that the lawyer provides or refrains from providing. 28 He
underscored that all his examples "deal with what, from the perspective of
American law regarding lawyers, is left to the lawyer's own discretion" and
therefore present no conflict between Jewish law and the professional norms.
29
More recently, an assumption that lawyers may draw on religious understandings
in making professional decisions underlaid several essays in the Texas Tech Law
Review symposium on Faith and the Law. 30 This collection included stories of
how religious lawyers and judges made particular professional decisions in
conformity with their religious understandings, frequently without any doubt
about their discretion to do so. 3 1
Most recently, some participants at an invitational conference on The Rel-
evance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work, conducted at Fordham Law School in
June 1997, seemed to make the strongest possible claim for the role of morality
and religion in the lawyer's work - namely, that personal moral and religious
27. Levinson, supra note 16, at 1600-11.
28. Specifically, Levinson provides four examples. Id. The first example involves representing a Jewish
client who is seeking to bring a lawsuit. Id. at 1604. A Jewish lawyer might be obligated to advise the client of
the religious "duty to summon the potential defendant to a rabbinical court." Id. The second involves
representing a Jewish couple seeking a civil divorce. Id. at 1606. The lawyer might be obligated " 'to advise the
couple that they must also seek a divorce that is proper according to halacha,' that is, to obtain a get - an official
decree authorizing the dissolution of the marriage - from a properly constituted rabbinical court." Id. The third
example involves representing a mixed-marriage couple seeking a divorce. Id. Because such a marriage is
halakhically forbidden, the lawyer might be obligated to give no advice about how to save the marriage or to
counsel against trying to do so. Id. The last example involves an Orthodox Jew who might be obliged to refrain
from representing criminal defendants in order to avoid violating a decree that might be read to forbid the
observant Jewish lawyer from helping a criminal escape punishment. Id. at 1607.
For additional examples, see Stem, supra note 3, at 1366-67 (noting that Jewish law might be read to prohibit
seeking prejudgment interest). See also id. at 1369-70 (explaining that where spouses in a divorce action seek to
contest custody over their child, a lawyer who is of the same faith as the spouses may be tempted to push for
custody for the spouse who will provide a better religious upbringing).
29. Levinson, supra note 16, at 1607.
30. Symposium, Faith and the Law, 27 Tx. TECH L. REV. 911 (1996).
31. See, e.g., Warren K. Anderson, Jr., Ecumenical Cosmology, 27 Tx. TECH L. REv. 983, 987-88 (1996)
(describing how one lawyer's religious and personal views have influenced his work); Collett, supra note 3, at
1053-54 (recounting an occasion during which love of "God and neighbor" influenced her decision to
recommend that her client accept a settlement); Raul A. Gonzalez, Climbing the Ladder of Success - My
Spiritual Journey, 27 TEx. TIECH L. REV. 1139 (1996) (detailing the author's personal and religious growth and
how such growth has impacted his career). But see al-Hibri, supra note 19, at 948-50 (discussing tension
between the author's religious principle of fairness and the "adversarial way of doing things" when attempting
to draft an agreement in the best interests of her client).
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beliefs may be brought to bear on all decisions that lawyers make, including
decisions about how to represent clients. This claim was embedded in the
propositions "that lawyers are morally accountable for all their actions ' 32 and
that "a lawyer's moral and spiritual traditions properly play an important role in
the lawyer's making of all significant decisions or choices.", 33 To be sure, both
propositions are ambiguous.34 But one fairly can read both as assuming not
simply that lawyers' moral understandings are sometimes relevant, but that they
are invariably relevant,35 and even dispositive, to the decisions that lawyers
make.36 On this view, lawyers can always reconcile their moral or religious
32. Conference on the Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work, Working Group on the Practice of Law as
a Vocation or Calling, Draft Agenda (1997) (on file with author).
33. Conference on the Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work, Working Group on Deciding Whether to
Represent a Client, Draft Agenda (1997) (on file with author).
34. The recommendation that the American Bar Association's (ABA) model disciplinary rules should hold
lawyers "morally accountable" see Conference on the Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work, supra note 32
(discussing this recommendation), is unclear in at least three respects. First, it is unclear to whom lawyers would
be accountable. To themselves and their own consciences? To their clients? To disciplinary authorities? To
members of the bar or bar associations? To the public at large? Second, it is unclear whose morality must be
taken into account. The lawyer's personal morality? Professional morality? Common morality? Third, the
recommendation is unclear about the relevance of the lawyer's religious understandings to the moral accounting
prescribed by the proposed rule. Would the proposed model rule require religious lawyers to take account of
their religious understandings, allow them to do so, or forbid them from doing so?
Likewise, questions are raised by the observation that "a lawyer's moral and spiritual traditions properly play
an important role in the lawyer's making of all significant decisions or choices." See Conference on the
Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work, supra note 33 (discussing this recommendation). First, it is unclear
whether lawyers must or simply may draw on their moral and spiritual traditions. That is, do lawyers act
improperly in failing to take their religious and moral traditions into account? Or is it simply that those lawyers
who elect to do so are acting properly? Further, it is unclear whether this statement is meant to describe existing
professional norms, to prescribe appropriate professional norms, or to prescribe how lawyers should conduct
themselves even when personal moral or religious considerations conflict with professional norms. In other
words, is it that the "ethical codes" presently accommodate lawyers' moral or religious traditions in all cases? Is
it that they should accommodate such traditions? Or is it that lawyers should regard their moral or religious
understandings as the higher authority, so that regardless of whether lawyers' moral and spiritual understandings
conform with professional norms, they should act on the basis of the former? See Thomas L. Shaffer & Julia B.
Meister, Is This Appropriate?, 46 DuKE L.J. 781 (1997) (discussing ambiguity of the term "appropriate" when
used to describe a legal or moral judgment).
35. Both declarations use the word "all" to describe the professional conduct to which morality and/or
religion is relevant. The first declaration is prescriptive: Lawyers should be "morally accountable for all their
actions." See Conference on the Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work, supra note 32 (discussing this
quotation). The second is either descriptive, prescriptive or both: Lawyers' "moral and spiritual traditions
properly play an important role in the... making of all significant decisions or choices." See Conference on the
Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work, supra note 33 (discussing this recommendation). Both conclusions
are absolute. Moral and/or religious understandings that lie outside the professional norms are not merely
relevant on occasion. They are relevant to all decisions and therefore must always be taken into account.
36. In calling on lawyers to give a moral accounting with regard to all their conduct, the first group appeared
to assume that all conduct undertaken by lawyers can be justified in moral terms. Further, the group must have
intended the justification to be made in terms of personal rather than professional morality. Otherwise, the
recommendation would be trivial. It would be nothing more than a demand that lawyers' conduct comply with
professional norms. Likewise, the second group's conclusion that "a lawyer's moral and spiritual traditions
properly play an important role," see Conference on the Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work, supra note
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understandings with the legal profession's ethical norms, because the profes-
sional norms invariably accommodate moral and religious understandings.37
II. THE PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATION TO EXCLUDE PERSONAL MORALITY
AND RELIGION FROM THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
Are there situations in which the applicable professional norms would fore-
close lawyers from making decisions based on their personal religious or moral
beliefs? Consider the following possibilities:
Example One: Confidentiality (part one)
Hopewell, a lawyer, represents Jones, a criminal defendant, who discloses that
he has committed a murder for which an innocent man, Smith, is about to be
executed. Jones instructs Hopewell not to reveal this information unless it can
be used to Jones's benefit.38
In this situation, the professional rules governing confidentiality appear to
forbid a lawyer from revealing a confidence in order to save an innocent human
life - a result, Monroe Freedman has argued, that is "[in]consistent with the
sanctity of life in Jewish tradition" and that should be changed.39 This scenario
was selected as the base topic of the recent Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
symposium on "Faith and the Law"''4 precisely because it seemed to provide an
example of where a lawyer who believes that a confidence should be betrayed
where necessary to save an innocent human life may not, consistent with the
codified professional norms, act on the basis of this personal moral or religious
belief.4 1
In this example, the content of the applicable professional norm is contested
precisely because a lawyer's personal beliefs coincide with a common, universal,
33 (discussing this recommendation), in all decisionmaking implies that, in all cases, the lawyer can act
according to his or her moral and spiritual traditions. Otherwise, the role of lawyers' moral and spiritual
traditions would not be an important one.
37. Sanford Levinson has suggested that this view might be identified with Thomas Shaffer's conception that
a religious lawyer is a member of a religious community first and a lawyer second. See Levinson, supra note 16,
at 1578, quoting SHAFFER & StAFFER, supra note 3, at 198 (discussing how a professional identity is constituted
and contributed to by professional participation).
38. See Symposium, Executing the Wrong Person: The Professionals' Ethical Dilemmas, Symposium
Problem, The Wrong Man is About to be Executed for a Crime He Did Not Commit, 29 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV.
1543-1545 (1996) (describing the same hypothetical problem in greater detail).
39. Freedman, supra note 13, at 1136-37; see also id. at 1137 n.29 (citing Professor Freedman's prior writings).
40. Symposium, Executing the Wrong Person: The Professionals'Ethical Dilemmas, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1543 (1996).
41. See Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray Twice?: Reflections on Confidentiality, a Guilty Client, an
Innocent Condemned Man, and an Ethics-Seeking Defense Counsel, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1611, 1622 (1996)
(recognizing that under any ABA codification of professional norms "[t]he answer is the same: Ms. Hopewell
may not disclose her client's communication over his objection not even to save the life of an innocent man").
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and fundamental norm. Thus, on the rare occasions when lawyers encounter this
extreme situation, they are able to "interpret" the confidentiality rule in the
applicable professional code to allow disclosure.42 An implied exception to the
confidentiality requirement might be justified for any of several reasons, such as
the argument that the interests protected by the rule are outweighed by the interest
in protecting an innocent life or that the general rule must be interpreted in light
of reason or necessity. Thus, as Mary Daly has argued, "[t]o the extent that
[Hopewell] is morally committed to preventing the execution of an innocent man
it will not be difficult to justify her decision" on a ground other than flat-out"civil disobedience.", 43 That there is no published bar association ethics opinion
or judicial decision forbidding a lawyer from disclosing a confidence in a
situation such as this one supports the argument that this is not, in fact, an
example where professional norms foreclose a lawyer from acting in accordance
with personal belief, because the black letter of the confidentiality rule does not
accurately capture the professional understanding. 44
Example Two: Confidentiality (part two)
Hope, a lawyer, agrees to represent Young, a teenage child, in "abuse and
neglect"proceedings. Young confides that he is the subject of serious, but not
life-threatening, psychological or physical abuse at the hands of his father with
whom he resides, but directs Hope not to reveal this information to anyone. The
lawyer has a personal moral or religious belief that children should be
protected from physical and emotional harm of any kind. This leads her to
conclude that she must seek help for Young, even though doing so will require
betraying his confidence. She seeks guidance from the local bar association,
which sends her a copy of a recent ethics opinion of the Association of the Bar
42. Cf. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) (holding that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in setting aside a settlement where defendants' counsel failed to disclose to the plaintiff's counsel
and the court that the plaintiff was suffering from an aorta aneurysm that had been diagnosed by the defendants'
expert even though the defendants' counsel may not have had a legal or ethical obligation to reveal such
information).
43. Daly, supra note 41, at 1627; see also Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidential-
ity: Restating Law Without the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought to Be, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1631, 1634 (1996)
(arguing that while the codified professional rules should recognize explicitly a "life-saving exception," such an
exception is consistent with the existing professional norm as reflected in the unwillingness of disciplinary
authorities to bring charges against a lawyer who revealed a client confidence to save an innocent life); Robert P.
Lawry, Damned and Damnable: A Lawyer's Moral Duties With Life on the Line, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1641,
1652 (1996) (suggesting that notwithstanding the absence of an explicit "life-saving" exception to the Model
Rules, most would agree that an implicit exception covering such cases exists).
44. See W. William Hodes, Introduction: What Ought to Be Done - What Can Be Done - When the Wrong
Person Is in Jail or About to Be Executed? An Invitation to a Multi-Disciplined Inquiry, and a Detour About
Law School Pedagogy, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1547, 1576 & n. 115 (1996) (noting that in State v. Macumber, 582
P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1978), the case upon which the Loyola hypothetical was based, the State Bar Committee on
Ethics advised the lawyers that it would not be improper to disclose the client's confidence; recognizing,
however, that it is unclear upon what basis the Committee would allow such an exception).
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of the City of New York. The opinion concludes that in this precise situation the
lawyer may not disclose the confidence without the child's consent.
45
This is not a rare situation, but one that lawyers who represent children can
expect to encounter."6 Further, this is not a situation in which one can argue that
the professional norms are ambiguous and susceptible to an interpretation that
allows the lawyer to make the disclosure that she may believe to be dictated by
moral or religious principle. Because the professional norms clearly require
confidentiality, the lawyer's moral or religious views would not be relevant to her
decision about how to treat the child's confidence under the professional norms.
It would not be true to say that the lawyer acts properly in relying on her moral or
religious understandings, at least as far as the "law of lawyering ' 47 is concerned,
even if it may be true from the perspective of some perceived higher obligation.48
One might argue, however, that this scenario does not in fact present the
lawyer with a moral decision, other than the decision of whether to comply with
the professional norms. Therefore, it does not contradict the claim that moral and
religious beliefs may appropriately be brought to bear on all of the lawyer's
professional decisions. Properly understood (or, as necessarily refined), this
claim does not address all aspects of professional conduct, but only those as to
which the lawyer has some discretion: that is, where there is a decision to be
made - not where the professional norms dictate only one decision."9
Example Three: Judicial decisionmaking
The lawyer, Judge Yaccarino, is called on to decide the visitation rights of Dr
Bornstein with respect to two children who are in his ex-wife's custody and who
have refused to see him. Judge Yaccarino holds the personal belief that divorce
is immoral, as well as a religious conviction that children should respect and
45. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op.
1997-2 (1997).
46. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohm, Foreword: Children and the Ethical Practice of Law, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 1281, 1282 (1996) (studying a hypothetical child welfare case where the child's express
desires conflict with his lawyer's belief as to the best interest of that child).
47. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 13 (coining phrase "law of lawyering").
48. Cf Levinson, supra note 16, at 1610-11 (noting that, for an observant Jewish lawyer, the conflict
between the professional duty of confidentiality and a Halakhic duty of disclosure is "a true conflict of legal
obligations, rather than a more conventional conflict between law and morals," and that "presumably, a lawyer
who cared enough to seek out Halakhic guidance would feel obligated to obey its commands, even at the cost of
violating the secular law").
49. Charles W. Wolfram, The "Ethics" of Lawyers, 11 CORNELL L. FORUM 10, 13 (1984). Wolfram writes:
[Tihinking about the work of lawyers requires thinking about its morality. Lawyers are impelled not
only by the direct and sanctionable commands of professional regulations and other law. Those
commands cover only a minute fraction of the decisions a lawyer must make in the practice of law. In
their more-numerous legally unfettered decisions, lawyers are led perhaps by a desire to make money,
perhaps by a personal sense of honor. Situated somewhere amidst those nonlegal compulsions for
many lawyers is an acknowledged personal moral sense.
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revere their parents. Although two independent psychiatrists believe that the
children would be harmed if forced to visit their father Judge Yaccarino
understands his personal moral and religious beliefs to dictate such a result.
This example is based on In re Yaccarino,50 in which a New Jersey trial court
judge was removed from the bench for misconduct including basing his decisions
in a matrimonial proceeding on his personal and religious views.51 Among other
things, the judge expressed the view that he did not believe in divorce, and he
thought that the children's mother had "an absolute affirmative duty cast upon
[her] by [her] God" to persuade the children to visit voluntarily with their father.
The state supreme court concluded that the judge had "invoked personal beliefs
not legally relevant to the cause." 52
Although the court was not explicit, its condemnation may have been directed
at either the trial judge's justification of his decision on the basis of irrelevant
personal beliefs, his consideration of irrelevant personal beliefs in his delibera-
tions, or both. In all likelihood, however, the answer is both. Suppose the trial
judge had considered and relied on his personal beliefs in ruling on Dr.
Boorstein's motion, but had publicly justified his decision based exclusively on
50. 502 A.2d 3 (N.J. 1985).
51. As described by the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the course of the proceeding:
[Judge Yaccarino] invoked his own personal views about child rearing when, referring to the fact that
the Bornstein children would not call Dr. Bornstein "father" or "daddy," but only by his first name,
Alan, or simply as "he," [the judge] stated, "[i]f I had a kid and he called my wife Gail, his nose
would be out of joint and his teeth would rattle."
Respondent also indicated that his personal views concerning religion took precedence over the
law. When Mrs. Bornstein explained that she was in court because the children did not want to see
their father, and not because of an intention on her part to stop them from doing so, respondent told her
that she had "an absolute affirmative duty cast upon [her] by [her] God, not by Yaccarino, not by me,
but by God" to persuade them to change their attitude and to respect and revere their father, and that
she was not relieved of that responsibility because the father might have been a "100 carat cad."
Respondent again criticized Mrs. Bornstein for permitting the children to refer to their father as
"Alan" and then invoked a religious example by reminding Mrs. Bornstein of how God destroyed
Sodom and Gomorrah. When Mrs. Bornstein informed respondent that two independent psychiatrists
had advised her that it would be harmful if the children were forced to see their father, he stated, "I am
not talking about a psychiatrist. I am talking about God."
Respondent also advised those present in court of his personal views on divorce. He announced
from the bench that he did not believe in divorce. With respect to custody, respondent commented that
he could not imagine a situation in which a court would say to him "[y]ou may or you may not see
your children." In addition, respondent stated that if confronted with such a situation, "I would pull
this courthouse right off the hinges. There wouldn't be a courthouse. There can't be a world where
those are the rules in my life." When counsel demurred, respondent informed the attorney that while
both he [the attorney] and his client were "civilized," he himself was "uncivilized" since [sic] "I
don't believe in divorce." The respondent expressed his personal views that the State's matrimonial
laws and the court's authority to limit a parent's visitation rights would not be enforced by him.
Respondent also expressed his willingness to kill anyone including himself for the protection of his
children.
Id. at 10.
52. Id. at 11.
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relevant legal considerations. In such a case, the trial judge undoubtedly would
have escaped sanction because his reliance on impermissible considerations
would have been unprovable. Yet, it is hard to imagine that the court meant to
promote such a course of action, which would compound an abuse of discretion
with deceit.53
To be sure, Judge Yaccarino had considerable discretion in deciding whether to
allow Dr. Bornstein visitation rights, and a variety of considerations might
permissibly have entered into the decision.54 But the judge's own moral and
religious beliefs were not among them. The same difficulty is likely to arise
whenever judges exercise discretion under the law. Whether or not the law
explicitly identifies all the criteria on which the decision must be based, the
judge's personal moral and religious beliefs will be off limits because they will
not be included among the criteria that the judge explicitly or implicitly is
authorized to consider.55
In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Benjamin Cardozo provided another
illustration:
[A] judge, I think, would err if he were to impose upon the community as a rule
of life his own idiosyncrasies of conduct or belief. Let us, suppose, for
53. Stephen Carter might be expected to argue, however, that the judge may make decisions based on moral
conviction but then must justify them in the formal terms of professional norms to achieve this preferred result.
See Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 943-44 (1989) ("[I]f
religious conviction plays a role at all, it would enter into the deliberative process, but not the process of
justification.").
54. The literature on discretion, a subject beyond this Article's scope, is obviously extensive. See, e.g.,
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635,
635-36 (1971) (stating that the concept of judicial discretion "manifests itself in numberless ways" while
attempting to give judges guidance in using discretion "reflectively and purposefully").
55. One case provides another illustration. United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991). In that case,
the sentencing judge was found to have acted improperly in commenting about the defendant, a noted television
evangelist: "He had no thought whatever about his victims and those of us who do have a religion are ridiculed
as being saps from money-grubbing preachers or priests." Id. at 740. The court explained:
To a considerable extent a sentencing judge is the embodiment of public condemnation and social
outrage.... As the community's spokesperson, a judge can lecture a defendant as a lesson to that
defendant and as a deterrent to others. If that were all that occurred here, the court would have been
properly exercising its discretion, and we would be loathe to disturb what surely is an integral part of
the sentencing process.
Sentencing discretion, however, must be exercised within the boundaries of due process.... In this
case, the trial judge exceeded those boundaries. Courts have held that sentences imposed on the basis
of impermissible considerations, such as a defendant's race or national origin, violate due process....
While these cases focused on a defendant's characteristics, we believe that similar principles apply
when a judge impermissibly takes his own religious characteristics into account in sentencing.
Our Constitution, of course, does not require a person to surrender his or her religious beliefs upon
the assumption of judicial office. Courts, however, cannot sanction sentencing procedures that create
the perception of the bench as a pulpit from which judges announce their personal sense of religiosity
and simultaneously punish defendants for offending it. Whether or not the trial judge has a religion is
irrelevant for purposes of sentencing.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
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illustration, a judge who looked upon theatre-going as a sin. Would he be doing
right if, in a field where the rule of law was still unsettled, he permitted this
conviction, though known to be in conflict with the dominant standard of right
conduct, to govern his decision? My own notion is that he would be under a
duty to conform to the accepted standards of the community, the mores of the
times.56
In Cardozo's example, the judge's personal moral understanding appears to be an
idiosyncratic one, and the same might be said of Judge Yaccarino's views. But a
judge would be equally foreclosed from deciding cases based upon personal
moral views that, although not a matter of common morality, are widely shared.
For example, in the Texas Tech symposium, Judge Thomas M. Reavley sug-
gested that it would be improper for him as a judge to vote to stay the execution of
capital punishment in order to promote his "precept of the sacredness of life." 5
7
This is not to claim that a judge's conscience has no role in judicial decision-
making. At the very least, a judge's personal moral and religious beliefs are part
of what the judge invariably brings to the decisionmaking process - they form
part of the judge's "normative milieu," to return to Professor Hazard's phrase -
and the judge may be influenced by them subconsciously. 58 But it does not follow
that the judge may consciously draw on these beliefs in making judicial
determinations. On the contrary, to the extent they enter his mind, he would be
56. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 108 (1921).
57. Thomas M. Reavley, My Faith and My Work, 27 TEXAS TECH L. REv. 1295, 1300 (1996) ("I must
consider my authority and its limits. My office does not endow me with the decision on capital punishment; it
only authorizes me to ensure compliance with the United States Constitution. If the state has satisfied the
requirements of the Constitution, I have no legal authority to grant the stay of execution. I abuse my office and
the law if I use them to impose my moral beliefs."); accord People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456, 468 & n.* (N.Y.
1977) (Breitel, J., dissenting) (noting that in reviewing the death penalty, individual appellate judges may not
take account of their philosophical opposition or personal repugnance to capital punishment); see also Board of
Education v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Were my purely personal
attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's
opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew nor
Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic.").
A contrary approach has been adopted, however, by Justice Raul A. Gonzalez of the Supreme Court of Texas.
See Gonzalez, supra note 3 1, at 1147 (stating that he is a Roman Catholic who "believe[s] that we are called to
live our faith full time, not just on weekends, and that all our thoughts, words, and deeds should be impacted by
our religious convictions"). On occasion, his judicial decisions have been directly impacted by what he believes
as a Christian. Id. at 1148. For example, in Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1984), the issue was the
enforceability of an oral settlement agreement under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Gonzalez
dissented from the court's decision that the rules do not permit enforcement of an oral agreement because "[ilt
was clear to me that the only dispute was that one of the parties to the agreement had changed his mind and
chose not to be bound by the agreement. My faith teaches me that unless there are extenuating circumstances,
such as fraud or misrepresentation, people ought to live up to their commitments." Gonzalez, supra, at 1150.
See also James F. Nelson, The Spiritual Dimension of Justice, 27 TExAS TECH L. REv. 1237, 1249 (1996) ("I
cannot believe that it is possible for any judge to persevere and succeed without substantial reliance upon his or
her moral reservoir. Ajudge who feels able to divorce law from morality is subject to judicial schizophrenia.").
58. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 56, at 167 ("Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the
dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions,
which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.").
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expected to put them to the side and make the decision based exclusively on
considerations that the law prescribes. 59
Nor is this to say that a professional norm limiting reliance on personal moral
views necessarily can be enforced, as it was in Yaccarino,60 by a higher court.
One would expect that a savvy judge who bases his or her decision on personal
morality will not do so explicitly, but will cite only legally relevant grounds for
the decision.
Finally, none of this is to say that morality has no place in judicial decisionmak-
ing. There is room to debate whether and to what extent interpreting or applying
the law may require moral reasoning, reference to one's understanding of the
law's moral underpinnings, or consideration of commonly accepted moral
norms. 6' The point is simply that the professional norms governing judicial
59. This assumption underlies the law governing judicial recusal. Judges are assumed to be able to decide
cases based on legal considerations, notwithstanding relevant personal views based on prior experience. For
example, judges in civil rights cases have declined to recuse themselves in response to claims that they will be
biased because of their race, gender, or prior legal experience working on behalf of individuals who have
suffered discrimination. See, e.g., Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Motley, J.)
(finding that the sex and race of the judge insufficient to prove bias sufficient to warrant recusal); Pennsylvania
v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Higginbotham, J.), aljTd,
478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974) (failing to prove bias based upon judge's race and zealous advocacy on behalf of
African-Americans).
Interestingly, Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. made no reference to these prior decisions in response to a
religion-based recusal motion - notwithstanding that his coauthored casebook does so. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. &
KENNETH I. WINSTON, THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE 302-06 (1993): In Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69
F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1995), an abortion-related case, the plaintiffs sought his recusal based on the fervor of his
beliefs as a member of the Catholic Church, which supports the belief that (in Judge Noonan's words) "the
deliberate termination of a normal pregnancy is a sin, that is, an offense against God and against neighbor." Id.
at 400. The plaintiffs argued that Judge Noonan's " 'fervently-held religious beliefs would compromise [his]
ability to apply the law.' "Id. (quoting plaintiff's brief). In denying the motion, Judge Noonan relied entirely on
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to
any Office or public trust under the United States." Id., U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. He noted that the Catholic
Church was only one of a number of religious bodies or denominations teaching that abortion is ordinarily
sinful; Orthodox Judaism and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints were others. Id. Because it is
unworkable to distinguish "fervently-held" from "lukewarmly maintained" beliefs, the implication of the
plaintiffs' argument would be that judges who were Catholics, Jews, or Mormons would be excluded from
deciding a broad class of cases. Id. Judge Noonan concluded that this reduction in these judges' sphere of action
would, in effect, impose a religious test on the federal judiciary, in violation of the Constitution. Id. at 400-01. In
so ruling, Judge Noonan never expressly denied the plaintiffs' claim that his religious beliefs would compromise
his ability to apply the law in abortion-related cases. Such a denial may have been implicit, however, in Judge
Noonan's observation that "[i]f religious beliefs are the criterion of judicial capacity in abortion-related cases,
... I should have disqualified myself from hearing or writing Koppes v. Johnston, 850 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1988),
upholding the constitutional rights of an advocate of abortion." Id. at 400.
60. In re Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3 (N.J. 1985).
61. See, e.g., Cardozo, supra note 56, at 106 ("[The judge's] duty to declare the law in accordance with
reason and justice is seen to be a phase of his duty to declare it in accordance with custom. It is the customary
morality of right-minded men and women [that] he is to enforce by his decree."); id. at 109 ("Some relations in
life impose a duty to act in accordance with the customary morality and nothing more. In those the customary
morality must be the standard for the judge."); United States ex rel. lorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 921 (2d Cir. 1929)
(Hand, J.) (stating that when Congress requires a finding of moral turpitude as grounds for deportation, court
will try to ascertain "accepted moral notions"). But see Edmond Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 COLUM.
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decisionmaking do not invariably permit - and, in fact, generally forbid -
explicit reliance on personal moral views. Thus, the norms governing lawyers
qua judges would seem to provide a counter example to the robust claim that the
professional norms permit lawyers always to rely on personal conscience in
making professional decisions.
One might argue, however, that the judge's office or station in life is different
from that of the lawyer in private practice and, therefore, the exercise of judicial
discretion is different from the exercise of discretion in one's role as a lawyer
representing a private client. Judges are public officers. They are forbidden from
giving weight to their own religious beliefs because religious argument has no
place in the public square and/or because, as Kent Greenawalt has suggested,"one expects judges to rely on arguments they believe should have force for all
judges. In our culture this excludes arguments based on particular religious
premises. ' , 62 These principles do not apply to lawyers representing private
clients. Although lawyers have been termed "officers of the court,"63 "officers of
the law," 64 and "officers of the legal system,",65 lawyers are public officers only
in a metaphorical sense.66 Lawyers are not representatives of the public except
when they serve a public entity as a client. When lawyers represent private clients
- including religious institutions - they unquestionably may promote and
publicly advocate for private moral or religious understandings or beliefs
(namely, those of their private clients) in ways that judges could not. If that is the
case, it might be asked, cannot lawyers also act in accordance with their own
personal moral and religious beliefs, at least in areas that permit discretion?
Example Four: Defining and undertaking the objectives of the representation
Faith, a matrimonial lawyer, agrees to represent Mrs. Bornstein in response to
her ex-husband's motion to obtain visitation rights. Like Judge Yaccarino,6 7
Faith holds the view that divorce is immoral and that the religious principle
that children should honor their parents means that children of divorced
parents should spend time with the noncustodial parent whether they like it or
not.
L. REv. 838, 844 (1951) (arguing that naturalization provisions referring to applicants' "moral character," if not
struck down as unconstitutionally vague, should be interpreted in accordance with the judge's moral views, not
common societal views).
62. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Expression in the Public Square - The Building Blocks for an Intermediate
Position, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1411, 1419 (1996).
63. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 23, at 17-19 (discussing origin and significance of characterization
of lawyers as "officers of the court").
64. Id. at 688; Lawry, supra note 10, at 326.
65. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 18, at 131-32 ("Admission to the bar is the legal transformation of a lay
person into an officer of the legal system, effectuated by law through the act of the supreme court of the
jurisdiction or some similarly constituted authority.").
66. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of
Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 366, 373-76 (1981) (arguing that the "officer of the court
doctrine" is inapplicable to American attorneys in that they are not "ministerial agents of the judiciary").
67. In re Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3, 11 (N.J. 1985).
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If Mrs. Bornstein decides that out of concern for her children's psychological
well-being she does not want her ex-husband to visit her children, Faith may not
contravene Mrs. Bornstein's instructions by setting out to assist Dr. Bornstein's
attempt to compel the children to spend time with him. A lawyer must "abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation.",68 Nor may Faith
assert Mrs. Bornstein's position but, in doing so, covertly adopt a strategy that is
intended to fail. 6 9 For example, although Faith has considerable discretion to
decide what evidence to present to the court, she may not elect to withhold the
testimony of psychiatric experts if her purpose in doing so is to weaken Mrs.
Bornstein's case.70
This is true for two reasons. First, the decision about which tactics to employ
involves what William Simon has called a "grounded discretionary judgment"
akin to that employed by a judge. 71 Although the professional norms allow the
lawyer to "assume'responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues,", 72 the
considerations relevant to the lawyer's exercise of professional discretion are
implicitly prescribed by this rule. The lawyer must adopt tactics that are
reasonably calculated to achieve the client's objectives, or at least not to subvert
them. Thus, decisions about whether to retain experts, which experts to retain,
and which witnesses to call ordinarily are tactical decisions entrusted to the
lawyer, but a lawyer may not make these decisions to achieve objectives defined
by the lawyer's personal moral or religious beliefs.
68. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a). On the division of decisionmaking authority between lawyers and their
clients, see, for example, Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
307 (1980); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979); Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client
Decisionmaking and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FouND. RES. J.
1003 (1980); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney Client Relationship: The Argument for
Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 315 (1987) (arguing that in practice, the traditional rule allocating lawyer control
over "means" and client control of the "ends" of the representation affords too much control to the lawyer).
69. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 18, at 135-36, who writes:
A lawyer is an agent, not a principal. Having taken on a client, a lawyer is not free to pursue the
client's objectives only to the extent that the lawyer may see fit. The lawyer has to go forward to the
point that the client sees fit, within the limits of the law. Openly deviating from a client's purposes is
professional disloyalty, and covertly deviating from them involves professional dishonesty as well.
Client objectives impose substantial constraints on a lawyer's ethical autonomy .... [R]ecognition
that the client's objectives must prevail, as long as they are within the limits of the law, makes the
concept of independent judgment ethically more important even while rendering it more complex and
elusive.
Id.
70. In most cases, professional norms would permit the lawyer to withdraw from the representation to avoid
the conflict between the lawyer's personal beliefs and the client's objectives. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1. 16(b)(2)
(allowing a lawyer to withdraw from representing a client if the client will not be prejudiced or if the lawyer
considers the client's objective to be "repugnant"); see also infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text
(discussing the limitations on the lawyer's right to withdraw).
71. Simon, supra note 9, at 1120.
72. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.2 cmt.
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Second, the lawyer's discretion in making tactical decisions is subject to other
professional obligations. These include the duties of competence,73 zealous
advocacy,74 candor,75 and loyalty,76 all of which would be violated by the
surreptitious adoption of a strategy designed to further the lawyer's personal
objectives at the expense of the client's objectives.77 A lawyer who could not put
aside personal beliefs that conflicted with the client's objectives would therefore
have a conflict of interest that would foreclose undertaking or continuing the
representation.78
This is not to say that a lawyer may never draw on personal values in deciding
how to carry out the client's objectives. 79 The point is simply that, in the exercise
of discretion, the professional norms do not invariably allow lawyers to act in
accordance with their personal moral or religious understandings and that one
area in which the lawyer's personal views may be impermissible criteria is in the
exercise of discretion regarding how to achieve the objectives of the representa-
tion - an area of lawyer decisionmaking that is central to virtually every
representation in which a lawyer is engaged to act on the client's behalf.
III. THE ROLE OF PERSONAL MORALITY AND RELIGION
IN THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL DISCRETION
If the professional norms do not always permit a lawyer's personal moral and
73. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.").
74. See, e.g., MODEL CODE Canon 7 ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of
the Law").
75. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rules 1.4 ("A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the matter
and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."), 8.4(c) ("It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation.").
76. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.7 cmt. I ("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client.").
77. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED Rule 1.2 commentary at 22 (1996) [hereinafter
MODEL RuLES ANN.] (citing Model Rules 1.3 and 1.7 for the proposition that "a lawyer may not allow personal
interests and loyalties, including political or social viewpoints, to dilute the diligence or vigor with which a
client is represented").
78. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b) ("A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of the client
may be materially limited by... the lawyer's own interests .... ").
79. In some cases, the lawyer's personal values will coincide with professional values. In others, the lawyer's
values will coincide with those to which the client ascribes equal weight. In still others, conduct based on the
lawyer's values will not be inconsistent with the fulfillment of the client's legitimate objectives. In each of these
cases, a lawyer's reliance on personal values in making "tactical" decisions is likely to be unobjectionable.
Suppose, for example, that the lawyer for the opposing litigant requests additional time to respond to a motion
and the lawyer's client has no particular interest in expediting the matter. In that case, the client's objectives will
not be harmed by consenting to the request; further, a lawyer generally would be expected to consent as a matter
of "professional courtesy." For either of these reasons, a lawyer who consented, instead, based on the religious
belief that one should "love thy neighbor" could scarcely be criticized. In contrast, it would be improper, based
on the moral conviction that individuals should repay just debts, for a lawyer unilaterally to decide not to
interpose a defense based on the statute of limitations. See Wolf, supra note 12, at 45-46 ("While retaining a
client, a lawyer is obliged to make whatever legal claims the law explicitly and straightforwardly permits that
can be expected to foster that client's legal interests .... This means that a good lawyer must, for example,
invoke the statute of limitations when it applies in a way that promotes the achievement of a client's goals ....
(footnote omitted)).
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religious understandings to influence or determine how the lawyer makes
professional decisions, when and how may these understandings permissibly be
brought to bear? Consider the following additional scenarios.
Example Five: Establishing the lawyer'sfee
Feeney, who is terminally ill and has no family, has come to Goodheart, a
lawyer, to have his will drafted. Feaney has $2,000, which he wants to leave to
a former co-worker Goodheart's standard fee for a simple will is $500.
A lawyer's fee may not be unreasonable. 80 Assuming that $500 would be a"reasonable" fee for drafting Feeney's will, may Goodheart nevertheless charge
only a nominal fee or no fee at all for this service, based on her religious or
personal moral belief that it would be unconscionable to take what remains of
Feeney's assets? 8' Of course she may. Within the limits set by the professional
norms, it is entirely a matter of discretion what fee a lawyer sets. Further, the
norms set no criteria for, and exclude no criteria from, the exercise of this
discretion.
In many other areas of professional conduct, including those relating to the
representation of clients, the professional norms likewise appear to afford
lawyers unlimited discretion, albeit within certain bounds. To give a few
examples: A lawyer must "act with reasonable diligence and promptness." 82 But
a lawyer may, for moral or religious reasons, act even more diligently or
promptly than reasonably required. A lawyer must "keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter" 83 and "explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation. ' ' 84 But a lawyer may, for moral or religious reasons, provide
more detailed information than would reasonably be required.
In these contexts, the lawyer's professional discretion might be said to be
bounded but not grounded. That is, the lawyer must make a decision within
prescribed bounds or limits, but within those limits the grounds on which the
lawyer exercises discretion are left to personal conscience. In its preamble, the
Model Code identified the role of personal values in making decisions such as
these: "[e]ach lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against
80. MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(a).
81. Goodheart might chart her course by two biblical injunctions that David Smolin identified in his
discussion of how religious rhetoric could be brought into the debate about welfare and medicaid reform: "If a
man shuts his ears to the cry of the poor, he too will cry out and not be answered," and "He who oppresses the
poor to increase his wealth and he who gives gifts to the rich-both [sic] come to poverty." David M. Smolin,
Cracks in the Mirrored Prison: An Evangelical Critique of Secularist Academic and Judicial Myths Regarding
the Relationship of Religion and American Politics, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1487, 1491 (1996) (quoting Proverbs
21:13, 22:16).
82. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3.
83. Id. Rule 1.4(a).
84. Id. Rule 1.4(b).
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which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above the minimum
standards." 85
Example Six: Withdrawal from the representation
Faith initially agreed to represent Mrs. Bornstein (in Example Four) because
Mrs. Bornstein did not oppose her husband's application for visitation rights.
However, the reports of the psychologists lead Mrs. Bornstein to change her
mind. Thereupon, Faith changes her mind about the desirability of representing
Mrs. Bornstein, having concluded that her own personal moral and religious
belief - namely, that children should revere their parents - is offended by
Mrs. Bornstein's desire to accommodate her children's refusal to visit their
father
May Faith invoke her personal beliefs to justify withdrawing from the
representation? It might seem obvious that she may. At least in cases in which the
client will not be disadvantaged, the professional norms appear to give lawyers as
much freedom to exit the representation as to enter. Under the Model Rules, "a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accom-
plished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client."' 86 Indeed,
even when the client would be disadvantaged, a lawyer may terminate the
representation when "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer
considers repugnant." 87 This plainly would include objectives that offend the
lawyer's personal moral or religious understandings, and not solely those that are
repugnant as a matter of common morality.88
Faith cannot get off so easily, however. She has invoked a highly particular
personal belief.89 Mrs. Bornstein could not reasonably have anticipated that Faith
held this belief, which is far from universal. On the other hand, before. undertak-
85. MODEL CODE pmbl.; see also WoLFRAM, supra note 23, at 68 (suggesting that "what a lawyer can
conscientiously extract from the meaning of a professional rule should guide a lawyer's personal conduct
although, as a legal technician, the lawyer might advise another lawyer that the conduct would probably not in
fact result in a court imposing a sanction.").
86. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.16(b). The one limitation is that, in a judicial proceeding, the lawyer may require
judicial authorization to withdraw. Id. Rule 1.16(c).
87. Id. Rule 1.16(b)(3).
88. Professors Freedman and Shaffer have debated whether a lawyer should be permitted to withdraw from
the representation over the client's objection, in order to avoid participating in morally offensive conduct, where
doing so will prejudice the client's interests. Professor Freedman has advocated for a rule that would require the
lawyer to carry out the client's objectives in this situation, see Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the
Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 332-33 (1987) (arguing that there is an important "difference between"
rejecting a case and giving "less than the lawyer's zealous best"), while Professor Shaffer has argued in favor of
"conscientious objection." See Shaffer, supra note 12, at 877 (" 'If the client rejects the lawyer's moral counsel
and the lawyer feels strongly enough that the client's proposed course of action although lawful, is morally
repugnant, the lawyer has the right and the professional duty to desist.' ").
89. In another context, Professor Greenawalt has noted that "it is difficult to come up with any satisfactory
division" between "deep fundamental religious assumptions, such as that God loves all human beings equally"
and "narrower, more specific religious grounds, such as the Pope's explanation of how natural law precludes
artificial contraception and abortion." Greenawalt, supra note 62, at 1414. With respect to the role of personal
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ing the representation, Faith could have anticipated the possibility that her belief
would be implicated. Mrs. Bornstein's reaction is therefore likely to be, "Why
didn't Faith tell me she felt this way? Had she done so, I never would have hired
her." Even if Faith refunds her fee and Mrs. Bornstein has enough time to obtain
another lawyer, there is still a cost from Mrs. Bornstein's perspective. Like Faith,
Mrs. Bornstein has invested time and emotional energy in developing a client-
lawyer relationship of trust and confidence. Faith's withdrawal from the represen-
tation, on grounds that amount to a moral condemnation by the person in whom
the client has placed her trust, might reasonably be perceived to be an act of
betrayal.90
Some would argue that Faith had no business undertaking the representation in
the first place: if a lawyer's personal moral or religious understandings are
reasonably likely to restrain the lawyer from acting for a client in the manner in
which a lawyer ordinarily would be expected or required to act, the lawyer should
not accept the client. 91 This concept would be even more emphatically true in a
divorce action, given Faith's belief that divorce is immoral. Even if the client
initially seeks representation in opposing her spouse's divorce action, it is
foreseeable that she will change her mind, thereby bringing her objectives into
conflict with the lawyer's moral or religious convictions. At the very least, as a
matter of candor and to minimize the likelihood that the client will feel betrayed
by the lawyer who terminates the representation, a lawyer in Faith's position
should disclose to Mrs. Bornstein that she possesses particular beliefs that (a) are
not commonly held, (b) may be implicated in the particular representation, and
(c) if implicated, will lead Faith to terminate the representation.92
Example Seven: Client counseling
Faith initially agreed to represent Mrs. Bornstein (in Example Four) because
Mrs. Bornstein did not oppose her husband's application for visitation rights.
After undertaking the representation, two psychologists report that the children
will be harmed if they are forced to visit with Dr Bornstein. Mrs. Bornstein
seeks Faith's advice about whether to oppose the application.
values in professional decisionmaking, however, it seems fair to say that specific beliefs are likely to present
more difficult questions.
90. Cf. Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Commentary: Shaffer's Suffering Client, Freedman's Suffering Lawyer, 38
CAmH. U. L. REv. 129, 132 n.13 (1988) (arguing that withdrawal from the representation for reasons of
conscience "unfairly disappoints the client's reasonable expectations").
91. Cf. Levinson, supra note 16, at 1607 (quoting a rabbi who states that an observant Jewish lawyer who
believes that he is forbidden from helping a criminal escape the consequences of his act should not represent
criminal defendants).
92. In other contexts, the duty to keep a client reasonably informed has been read to include an obligation,
before undertaking the representation, to provide information that might reasonably affect the client's decision
whether to retain the lawyer. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
97-406 (Apr. 19, 1997) (concurring opinion of Lawrence J. Fox) ("Rule 1.4 contains an independent obligation
to inform the client that the lawyer is either representing or being represented by the lawyer on the other side.");
cf. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 600 (July 30, 1987) (stating that a lawyer should disclose
to prospective client that a member of the lawyer's firm is married to a member of the opposing counsel's firm).
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Undoubtedly, a lawyer's personal values may influence the manner in which
she counsels a client. Thus, as Teresa Collett has described, a lawyer believing
that you should "love your neighbors as yourself" may be influenced to relate to
her clients in a particular way, for example, with expressions of concern for the
clients' emotional as well as legal needs.9 3 In discussing the influence of his
religious beliefs, Joseph Allegretti made the similar point that "[s]ometimes
lawyers serve clients ... just by being present and listening, by taking the client
seriously and valuing the client as a person."-94 Both also assume, however, that a
lawyer's moral and religious beliefs may equally influence the content of a
lawyer's advice.95 Is this invariably true? For example, may Faith, influenced by
her personal belief that children should revere their parents, urge that, notwith-
standing the psychologists' report, Mrs. Bornstein should not oppose her hus-
band's application and, indeed, that it would be immoral for her to do so?
The professional norms appear to assign a significant role to lawyers' moral
understandings in the context of client counseling.96 The Model Rules say that "it
is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in
giving advice, ' 97 and the predecessor Model Code was to like effect.98 Some
have argued, further, that giving advice about moral considerations ought to be
required, not simply permitted.99
This presents two important questions, however. First, whose moral understand-
93. See Collett, supra note 3, at 1052 ("As a Christian woman I have professed a belief in the God who calls
me to care about myself and others .. ").
94. Allegretti, supra note 24, at 969.
95. Id. ("We are ... confident as well that God can use us as instruments of grace and love. Sometimes
lawyers serve clients by the advice they give .... Sometimes by prophetically raising issues or concerns that
their clients would just as soon ignore."); Collett, supra note 3, at 1052 ("[L]ove born of faith causes us to love
God and seek justice. It calls us to relate to our clients in the fullness of their present pain or desire.... The son
considering a will contest is provided both an accurate assessment of the legal issues present in the facts and a
caution that such actions destroy family solidarity. The business partners seeking incorporation are given
counsel concerning both the legal implications of creating such an entity and the manner in which such entities
can contribute to or detract from building up the common good.").
96. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Doing the Right Thing, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 691, 695 (1992) ("With regard to
interjection of personal, moral[,] and prudential values, under the governing rules of professional ethics the
lawyer has authority and at times the duty to be assertive."); id. at 699 ("Thinking of a client as a 'damned fool'
is not exactly formal legal analysis. To the contrary, it involves unashamed interjection of personal and
prudential considerations into giving legal advice. The rules of professional ethics recognize the propriety of
doing so.").
97. MODEL RULES Rule 2.1 cmt. (1983); see also id. Rule 2.1 ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social[,] and political factors, that may be
relevant to the client's situation.").
98. See MODEL CODE EC 7-8 ("Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal
considerations.... In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out
those factors [that] may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.").
99. See Jamie G. Heller, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How to Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE LJ.
2503, 2504 (1994) ("[The legal counselor should provide what this Note calls 'full-picture' counseling."); Margulies,
supra note 11, at 214 (arguing that lawyers have a responsibility to counsel clients on moral considerations); Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOitRE DAME L. REv. 231, 231 (1979) (stating that a lawyer's
personal moral and religious views should enter into discussions of advocacy).
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ings may be raised: those of the client? those commonly recognized in society?
the lawyer's unconventional personal beliefs? the lawyer's religious beliefs?
Second, how may moral understandings be employed in counseling clients? Is
the lawyer limited to identifying a moral consideration? May the lawyer affirma-
tively recommend that the client base his decision on the particular consider-
ation? May the lawyer rely, explicitly or tacitly, on the moral consideration in
formulating the lawyer's recommendation about what decision the client should
make?
The most constricted conception of the lawyer's discretion has been advanced
by those who advocate "client-centered" counseling. For example, Lawyers as
Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach,' ° a leading law-school text, cautions
that "though you may ultimately provide a client who asks for it with your
opinion, you should do so only after you have counseled a client thoroughly
enough that you can base your opinion on the client's subjective values, not on
your own."' 01 When clients clearly request "advice based on your personal
values," you may offer such advice out of respect for "clients as autonomous
individuals." 102 But even then, the text advises, you should "be sure to mention
the [personal] values and attitudes on which you rest your decision" so that"clients can compare their attitudes to yours when deciding how much weight to
give your opinion." t0 3
Again reflecting their porous nature, the professional norms permit a lawyer to
choose among philosophies of client counseling. It is permissible for lawyers to
approach the task less neutrally. Indeed, the above-quoted provision itself implies
that lawyers may at least "refer" to relevant considerations that the client has not
himself identified as relevant to his decisionmaking process. As a practical
matter, it is hard to see how a lawyer could learn which moral considerations are
important to the client without identifying considerations that may be relevant
and inviting the client to reflect on whether or not he considers them important.1 04
Further, it is not uncommon for lawyers to make unsolicited recommendations
either about what considerations the client should weigh or about what decision
the client ultimately should make. There is nothing approaching a professional
consensus in favor of a "client-centered" approach under which a lawyer
100. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991).
101. Id. at 279.
102. Id. at 280 & n.49.
103. Id. at 350.
104. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics, supra note 22, at 51-52 (arguing that lawyers
have an obligation to engage in moral counseling, which involves presenting moral considerations to the clients
for their consideration, rather than "preempt[ing] ... clients' moral judgments" by, for example, "assum[ing]
that the client wants us to maximize his material or tactical position in every way that is legally permissible,
regardless of non-legal considerations"); Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional
System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 204 (1978) (asserting that "the attorney acts both professionally and morally
in assisting clients to maximize their autonomy, that is, by counseling clients candidly and fully regarding the
clients' legal rights and moral responsibilities as the lawyer perceives them").
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generally must refrain from expressing any opinion at all, much less one based on
the lawyer's own values.1"5
Nonetheless, the lawyer's discretion in counseling clients, as in many contexts,
is both loosely prescribed and circumscribed. The lawyer is limited to moral and
other non-legal considerations that are relevant - that is, considerations that
might be weighed by the client in making the particular decision. Further, the
professional obligations of competence and candor place limits on how advice is
presented as well as on its content. In general, a client seeks the lawyer's advice
in order to be able to make an informed decision. Advice that undermines the
client's ability to make an informed decision - because the advice is coercive,"0 6
false, incomplete, or so offensive as to undermine the client's trust in the
lawyer' 0 7 - thus may be contrary to applicable professional norms.
For these reasons, as the above-quoted text 0 8 on client counseling suggests, it
would be improper for a lawyer to recommend a course of conduct when the
lawyer's motivation is to promote the lawyer's unexpressed personal views.' 09
Suppose that Mrs. Bornstein seeks Faith's advice about whether to support,
oppose, or take no position with respect to her husband's application for
visitation rights. Mrs. Bornstein may express concern about legal considerations.
For example, her response and/or the judge's decision may affect other legal
issues, such as the terms of her ex-husband's support payments. She may express
concern about non-legal considerations. For example, her willingness to support
or oppose her children's desires may influence her relationship with them, and the
judge's decision may affect their psychological well-being. If Faith recommends
that Mrs. Bornstein support her ex-husband's application without revealing that
this advice is predicated on personal values that Mrs. Bornstein does not share,
the advice will be both incompetent and deceptive, because Mrs. Bornstein will
105. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REv.
501,509 (1990) ("The most controversial aspect of Binder and Price's client-centered counseling model is their
great resistance to the lawyer giving the client her opinion as to what action the client should take."); Stephen
Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 744 (1987) (viewing it as manipulative for lawyers to
withhold their opinions). For a critique of the client-centered approach, arguing that a lawyer cannot be morally
neutral, see SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 2, at 19-24. See also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on
Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 623 (1985) (criticizing lawyer amorality).
106. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 836 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1991) (Dubofsky, J., dissenting) (stating that the
defense lawyer's advice about the "potential hazards of incarceration" in the event the defendant was convicted
after trial "went far beyond a legitimate informational advisement and recommendation and constituted threats
and coercion").
107. See, e.g., Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 780, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that, if defense
lawyer directed racist outburst at defendant, as alleged, "[sluch a disrespectful and inappropriate eruption
would signal and be tantamount to (unless somehow cured) a 'total lack of communication' far exceeding the
parameters of any duty on the part of counsel to deliver to his client a 'pessimistic prognosis' of his legal
position.") (quoting United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985)).
108. See supra notes 97-103 for that text.
109. See, e.g., Williams v. Chrans, 742 F. Supp. 472, 480 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (criticizing defense lawyers in
capital cases for pressuring client to plead guilty because lawyers were motivated to do so by their moral
objections to the death penalty).
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erroneously understand that Faith is recommending the position that, in Faith's
view, would best fulfill Mrs. Bornstein's objectives.
Thus, when it comes to whether personal views are better expressed or left
unexpressed, the analogy to discussions of "religion in the public square"' 0
breaks down. It is generally considered more troublesome for legislators to
invoke explicit religious arguments to justify their decisions than to rely on
religious arguments tacitly in making decisions."' In contrast, it is more
troublesome for a lawyer to conceal the religious (or personal moral) beliefs
underlying her advice than to make them explicit in urging a course of conduct.
The lawyer's advice is deceptive when the lawyer conceals her motivations,
because the client will reasonably misunderstand that the advice reflects the
lawyer's judgment about how best to achieve the client's objectives, not the
lawyer's objectives.
May a lawyer make a recommendation based on values that the client does not
share, as long as the lawyer is candid?1 2 The strongest case for doing so is when
the lawyer's values coincide with professional values' t3 or common societal
values. "14 Returning to Example One," 5 few would contest that Hopewell has the
professional discretion to advise Jones that "[a]llowing an innocent person to die
when you have the power to save him is... a serious moral wrong," 116 that Jones
should consider this in making his decision whether to admit to the murder for
which Smith awaits execution, and, indeed, that Jones ought to make the
110. See supra text accompanying note 62 for this analogy.
111. See Greenawalt, supra note 62, at 1419 (stating that judges are expected to rely on arguments that have
force with all judges, not arguments with religious premises).
112. Cf Post, supra note 12, at 464 (suggesting that lawyers should not be discouraged from influencing
clients to act in accordance with the lawyer's ethical judgment, "so long as this is done without the pretense of
professional authority"). That this question can be asked suggests the distance that the professional norms have
traveled since the nineteenth century, when a lawyer's moral understandings were presumed to be superior to
those of the client. See Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 2, at 32, 35-37 (discussing American tradition of lawyers
making moral choices for clients as "gentleman lawyers"); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text
(stating that a lawyer must obey his conscience).
113. For example, when a client commits perjury during the representation, the lawyer is obligated to
"remonstrate" with the client to remedy the wrongdoing. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 cmt. Likewise, lawyers may,
and generally should, advise clients to comply with the law. Cf MODEL CODE EC 7-5 ("A lawyer should never
encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid
punishment therefor."). Professor Freedman has argued that one of the justifications for an "ethics of
lawyer-client trust and confidence" is precisely that, in the context of such a relationship, the lawyer is better
able to provide effective moral counseling to dissuade clients from committing crimes, frauds, or perjury.
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' EThics, supra note 22, at 87-88, 120.
114. See, e.g., In re Ludlam's Estate, 285 N.Y.S. 597, 600 (Sur. Ct. 1936) (finding that an attorney advising
his client to return a gift because the gift was ineffective is not duress).
For a criticism of a lawyer's reliance on societal values, see Reed Elizabeth Loder, Out of Uncertainty: A
Model of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 2 S. CAL. INmRDisc. L. 89, 134-35 (1993) (discussing different
moral standards used by lawyers in decision making).
115. See supra text accompanying note 38 for that example.
116. Lawry, supra note 43, at 1646.
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admission in light of this moral consideration. The advice would be proper
notwithstanding that Jones himself may appear to value human life less highly
and that such an admission may be contrary to Jones's own liberty interests.
Going further, Robert Lawry argues that Hopewell would have an affirmative
obligation to urge Jones to make disclosure. 17
Lawyers act in accordance with a legitimate understanding of the professional
norms when they counsel clients to complywith common societal norms, just as
when they advise clients to comply with the law. Lawyers have a responsibility to
society, as well as to individual clients.' 8 At the same time, simply encouraging a
client to act in accordance with societal and legal norms would not seem to be
unduly coercive, offensive, or misleading. For example, Hopewell's recommen-
dation that Jones take responsibility for the murder for which Smith is to be
executed would demonstrate respect for Jones as an individual who, notwithstand-
ing his prior wrongs, is capable of moral decisionmaking. Indeed, Jones might
find it surprising, and perhaps even disrespectful, if his lawyer were not to advise
him to act in accordance with what Jones surely must know to be the accepted
societal norms.
The more troublesome case is where the lawyer recommends that the client
act, or consider acting, on the basis of a religious belief that the client does not
share.11 9 Returning to Example Seven,' 20 suppose that Faith advises Mrs.
Bornstein, "Despite what the psychologists say, you should not oppose your
ex-husband's request for visitation, because it is God's will that your children
visit with him." Or suppose, putting it less forcefully, Faith advises, "In deciding
on what position to take in this proceeding, you might want to bear in mind that it
is a tenet of my religious faith that children revere their parents." In either case, if
Mrs. Bornstein is not a member of the same religious faith and does not share
Faith's religious beliefs, she is likely to feel confused, because Faith's beliefs are
irrelevant to her own decisionmaking, and offended, because of the implication
that her own religious beliefs (if any) are inadequate.1 21 Mrs. Bornstein cannot
reasonably be expected to adopt Faith's religious beliefs as the basis of her own
decisionmaking. A lawyer-client relationship is not conducive to the kind of
theological dialogue that might be necessary to convince Mrs. Bornstein of the
appropriateness of Faith's theological views and, in any case, it would be abusive
117. Id. at 1645.
118. See, e.g., MODEL RULES pmbl. ("Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society.").
119. Although Professors Shaffer and Cochran take the view that "[i]f lawyers are to talk with clients about
the moral values they have, they may have to talk about religious moral beliefs," SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra
note 2, at 60, this is not necessarily to say that the lawyer should recommend that the client act on the basis of the
lawyer's religious values. Further, the authors' proposed framework for moral discourse does not expressly
contemplate that such a recommendation be made. Id. at 113-34.
120. See supra text accompanying note 93 for that example.
121. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHics IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 146-49 (1978) (discussing whether a
lawyer should give ethical advice).
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to use the representation as an occasion for an uninvited discussion of religion.122
This is the problem of "religion in the public square" '23 writ small. A religious
lawyer simply is not offering competent counseling when he presents advice that
is inaccessible to the nonbelieving client. ' 24
When a client has sought the lawyer's advice, it is less troublesome from the
perspective of professional norms for the lawyer to respond with a recommenda-
tion based on the lawyer's non-conventional moral beliefs (or, perhaps, character-
izing one's religious beliefs as personal moral values). Suppose that Faith says,
"I believe it is morally right that children should revere their parents. You should
encourage your children to do so. They are not showing proper reverence when
they refuse to visit with your ex-husband." This expression of personal moral
belief would be less offensive to the client than the comparable expression of
religious belief and more conducive to moral dialogue. Mrs. Bornstein may have
no particular belief about how children should treat their parents. Or she may
believe, contrary to Faith, that parent-child relations should involve mutual
respect but not reverence, and that it is important at times for children to stand up
to authority, including parental authority, rather than invariably deferring. Faith's
advice therefore may challenge one of Mrs. Bornstein's particular values, but not
her entire system of values or faith. It is conceivable that Mrs. Bornstein would
want to refine or reevaluate her particular views on parent-child relations in light
of Faith's alternative moral proposition, which Mrs. Bornstein can evaluate
independently of either a theological source or an entire set of beliefs of which it
is part. t25 It seems more realistic to think that Mrs. Bornstein will be open to
considering the appropriateness of Faith's belief as a personal moral proposition
than as a religious one. Thus, a lawyer's belief about right and wrong is more
likely to be "relevant" to the client when it is, or is cast as, a personal moral belief
(i.e., a belief without an explicit theological source) rather than as a religious
belief, even though a religious belief may be shared more widely within the
community. 126
122. Even in dealing with fellow believers, a lawyer may be acting contrary to client expectations in
attempting to explore explicitly religious considerations. Cf B. Carl Buice, Practicing Law to the Glory of God,
27 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1027, 1032 (1996) ("I will no longer represent members of my church. My role
expectations and theirs become mixed and very confusing. People want different things from their priest and
their lawyer.").
123. See supra text accompanying note 62 for more on "religion in the public square."
124. This is not to say that lawyers cannot give advice with reference to their own religious understandings to
those of different religious faiths. No one would fault a lawyer for invoking concepts such as compassion,
forgiveness, or charity, for example, because these values, although differently understood, are commonly
shared.
125. It is also conceivable, if the moral discourse is open, that the lawyer will reevaluate her own moral
proposition. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL EHlcs, supra note 1, at 248. This is true, at least, if the proposition is
not a religious belief characterized by the lawyer as a personal moral belief.
126. In real life, moral views and religious views are unlikely to be as easily differentiated and neatly cabined
as they may appear to be in this example. Thomas Shaffer has informally offered me the example that many who
speak of an obligation to help poor people may not understand or explicate this as a religious obligation. Nor are
1997]
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Even advice framed in terms of moral but nonreligious concerns may pose
problems, however, when the client has not sought the lawyer's advice, but has
engaged the lawyer to carry out a specific objective that the lawyer finds morally
objectionable. For example, if Mrs. Bornstein retained Faith for the specific
purpose of opposing Dr. Bornstein's visitation application, Faith's subsequent
attempt to discourage Mrs. Bornstein from pursuing this objective, whether on
moral or religious grounds, would seem to reflect a lack of zealousness and/or
loyalty. In a forthcoming article in connection with the Fordham conference,
Howard Lesnick addresses this problem. 127 He takes issue with a Tennessee
ethics opinion that called into question whether a lawyer, appointed to represent a
minor seeking an abortion, may strongly recommend a course of action that is
contrary to the client's initial objectives but consistent with the lawyer's moral or
religious views in opposition to abortion. 128 Lesnick suggests that, because the
client's stated objective may be contingent or may not be her true objective, the
lawyer may provide information relating to the wisdom or virtue of the client's
decision and invite her to engage in reflection and dialogue.' 29 Lesnick acknowl-
edges, however, that the lawyer must counsel the client sensitively, with restraint,
and with openness to the possibility of accepting the client's objectives, and that
the lawyer must respect the client's decision to end the dialogue.' 30 Like the
Tennessee ethics committee, Lesnick would seem to condemn counseling in
which the lawyer strongly discourages the client from pursuing her initial
objective. His point, however, is that considerable room remains for client
counseling that gives expression to the lawyer's moral and religious beliefs in a
manner that invites genuine mutual exploration.
moral and religious views easily separated from legal, scientific, and other views. Lawyers may be influenced
not only by professional ethics and personal morality, but also by contingent epistemological assumptions.
Further, one set of beliefs may influence the other. For example, Carrie Menkel-Meadow has pointed out to me
informally that Faith may believe that particular child-rearing practices are most conducive to raising
psychologically healthy children and that her beliefs may be both subject to disagreement within the scientific
community and subject to change as scientific knowledge advances. Faith's religious beliefs about parent-child
relations may influence her choice among plausible psychological understandings. And, like her religious
beliefs, her scientific views may be taken on faith. Similarly, a lawyer's moral or religious opposition to the
death penalty may be bound up with her belief that the death penalty is an ineffective deterrent to crime. This
obviously poses a challenge insofar as lawyers might be expected to acknowledge, first to themselves and then
to their clients, the personal moral and/or religious beliefs underlying recommendations they make to their
clients.
127. Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 FoRDAtAM L. REv. (forthcoming 1997)
(manuscript at 2-7, 48-66, on file with the author), discussing Tennessee Formal Ethics Op. 96-F-140 (1996)
(holding that the duties of loyalty and zealous advocacy called in question whether a devout Catholic who is
appointed against his will to represent a minor seeking an abortion may "strongly recommend that his client
discuss the potential abortion with her parents or with other individuals or entities [that] are known to oppose
such a choice").
128. Id. (manuscript at n.74)
129. Id. (manuscript at 54-56 & n.126) (quoting Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interests, 77
MIcH. L. REv. 1078, 1080-81 (1979)).
130. Id. (manuscript at 59-61).
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Example Eight: Client counseling (part two)
Upright, a legal ethics expert, is consulted by Woodby, the managing partner of
a large metropolitan lawfirm. The lawfirm has discovered information giving
rise to a strong suspicion that one of its partners, Shady, has been billing clients
fraudulently. Woodby seeks Upright's advice about whether or not to disclose
the law firm's information to disciplinary authorities. Unknown to Woodby,
Upright possesses a personal moral and religious view that it is improper to
"snitch" on friends, family, colleagues, and others with whom one has a
relationship.
The first question this raises is the extent to which a lawyer may withhold
advice in light of the lawyer's personal moral or religious understandings.' 31 For
example, may Upright advise Woodby that the law firm has no legal obligation to
disclose Shady's possible wrongdoing 132 and leave it at that, rather than continu-
131. United States v. Lopez presents this issue where the defense lawyer agreed to represent a defendant
charged in a drug conspiracy, but stipulated that he would not negotiate a guilty plea with the government in
exchange for cooperation because, as he later told the court, he considered such negotiations "personally
morally and ethically offensive." United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1993) (Fletcher, J.,
concurring). For an extensive discussion of Lopez and issues it raises, see Daniel Richman, Cooperating
Clients, 56 OIo ST. L.J. 69 (1995).
Additionally, Sanford Levinson has provided an example of where an observant Jewish lawyer might
withhold advice based on the lawyer's understanding of a Halakhic command. Levinson, supra note 16, at 1606.
In his scenario, a lawyer is retained to represent a spouse in a divorce action involving one spouse who is Jewish
and one who is not. Because such a marriage is Halakhically forbidden, the lawyer might be required to
withhold advice about how to salvage the marriage or, indeed, to advise against doing so. Id. Levinson notes that
this is an interesting and troublesome example, id., but nevertheless concludes that it is left to the lawyer's
discretion and therefore does not involve conflict between religious and professional norms. Id. at 1607.
132. Although a lawyer has a general duty to report the misconduct of another lawyer, the relevant rules
qualify this obligation. See MODEL RULES Rule 8.3(a) ("A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness[,] or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional
authority."); MODEL CODE DR 1-103(A) ("A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of
DR1-102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
a violation."). The rules apply only where a lawyer has knowledge, and not merely a strong suspicion, of
misconduct. See, e.g., N.Y. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 635 ("Although absolute certainty is not
required under the rule.... a mere suspicion of misconduct does not give rise to an obligation to report.... [The
rule] would not be triggered unless the lawyer has a clear belief, or possesses actual knowledge, as to the
pertinent facts."); Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DuKE L.J. 491, 516 ("[T]he knowledge
requirement seems to exempt the lawyer who has good faith questions about whether a violation has actually
occurred."). Even when they apply, these rules are thought to be widely ignored. See Hal Lieberman, A
Lawyer's Duty to Report Misconduct under DR 1-103(A), N.Y. L. J., Aug. 21, 1990, at I ("[Recent decisions]
have caused the bar to re-examine this duty, one [that] more than a few lawyers may have forgotten or wilfully
ignored."); WOLFRAM, supra note 23, at 683 ("Probably no other professional requirement is so widely ignored
by lawyers subject to it."). Further, disciplinary proceedings rarely are brought against lawyers for violating
them. Indeed, there has been only one widely reported decision sanctioning a lawyer for violating DR 1-103(A)
in recent years, and that decision was widely criticized. See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 531 (Ill. 1988) criticized
in Richard W. Burke, Where Does My Loyalty Lie?: In re Himmel, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 643 (1990);
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to, Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of
Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. RaV. 977 (critiquing the ways in which lawyers are held responsible for unethical
behavior). All of this suggests that the professional value underlying the rule is contrary to many lawyers'
personal morality.
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
ing on to discuss non-legal (including moral) considerations that might lead
Shady to make the disclosure voluntarily? Or may Upright identify only consid-
erations weighing against reporting, while omitting those that favor disclosure,
such as that the law firm's reputation may suffer if the public later learns that the
law firm knew of Shady's wrongdoing but did not report it? Woodby has sought
general advice about whether to disclose the information. Upright is not provid-
ing the agreed-on service, but is purporting to have done so, when he addresses
only the narrow question of whether Woodby is legally required to make
disclosure. Further, in order to address the broader question competently, a
lawyer must identify relevant non-legal considerations. Advice that identified
only considerations that weigh against disclosure would be incomplete and,
insofar as it seemed otherwise, misleading. It would be improper for Upright,
based on his personal moral or religious opposition to snitching, to give
incomplete or one-sided advice. 133
The second question is whether a lawyer may advise the client to act in
accordance with a personal moral or religious value that is contrary to a
professional value. It is clear that professional norms are comprised of more than
just enforceable rules. Implicit in the rules and the traditions of law practice are"professional values." 134 For example, William Simon has identified "promot-
ing justice" as one such value. 135 No doubt, lawyers can debate whether certain
propositions enjoy sufficient recognition to enter the pantheon of professional
values. Further, lawyers may often find that different professional values point in
different directions with respect to a given decision. Nonetheless, lawyers
concerned with the morality of their conduct might want to act not only in
conformity with the enforceable rules of professional conduct and other aspects
of the law governing lawyers, but also consistently with professional norms and
values that are not enforced or that are meant to be self-enforced.
For example, a lawyer is legally obligated to serve clients competently within
the standards set by malpractice law and professional rules. A lawyer also is
expected, however, to strive to provide clients better quality representation than
that which is minimally required by law. 136 Consequently, a lawyer would be
acting contrary to the professional norms insofar as he sought to provide
133. An additional problem in this example is the possibility that Upright's evaluation of the legal question
will be influenced by his personal values. The conflict-of-interest rule would require Upright to assess whether
his advice will be affected by his "own interests." MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.7(b). It is not self-evident, however,
that this phrase encompasses personal values. It might be argued that the rule applies insofar as the lawyer has a
perceived interest in acting or convincing the client to act in accordance with the lawyer's personal values. But
this might not capture all occasions on which lawyers' values will interfere with their ability to give detached
advice.
134. Cf MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 207-21 (identifying "fundamental values of the profession").
135. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 9, at 1083-84, 1090; (advocating ethical discretion when advancing or
pursuing even legally permissable course of action); SHAFFER & CoCHRAN, supra note 2, at 33 (quoting David
Hoffman's 1836 "Resolutions on Professional Deportment").
136. See, e.g., MODEL CODE EC 6-5 ("A lawyer should take pride in his professional endeavors. His
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professional representation to his clients that successfully met the minimal
standards set by the enforceable law but that was of no better quality than that.
In Example Eight,1 37 the lawyer's personal belief that an individual should not
reveal the misconduct of a friend or colleague - a belief that many others share
- is at odds with what, it seems fair to say, is the profession's recognition that it
is morally worthy conduct for a lawyer to report strong suspicions of another
lawyer's professional misconduct (where there is no bar against doing so),
because law is a self-regulating profession. 138 It might be appropriate for Upright
to identify the competing moral proposition in order to facilitate Woodby's ability
to make a decision in accordance with Woodby's own moral preferences. But it
would seem wrong, at least as far as the professional norms are concerned, for
Upright affirmatively to endorse the competing moral proposition, just as it
ordinarily would be wrong for a lawyer to advise a client to act contrary to law.
Thus, another way in which professional norms may limit lawyers' discretion is by
preempting particular personal and religious values that are inconsistent with profes-
sional values. This is not to say that a lawyer engages in sanctionable misconduct in
giving primacy to personal conscience in this situation. It is simply to say that the
lawyer cannot claim to be acting consistently with the professional norms: he may
claim to be a moral person, but not necessarily a well-regulated lawyer, 39
Example Nine: Disclosure
Prudence, a lawyer undertakes to represent a teenage client, Small, in an"abuse and neglect" case. Prudence concludes from her discussions with Small
that Small's life is endangered by his father, with whom Small lives. Small
insists that Prudence preserve the confidence. Prudence would like to comply,
because, like Upright, she believes that it is morally wrong to snitch on friends
and family, and she believes that Small would be doing this through her if she
were to report the father's threatening and abusive conduct. For guidance,
Prudence refers to her local bar association's ethics opinion, which says that
when a lawyer representing a teenage client honestly concludes that disclosure
of a client confidence is necessary to save the child's life, the lawyer has
obligation to act competently calls for higher motivation than that arising from fear of civil liability or
disciplinary penalty.").
137. See supra text accompanying note 122 for Example Eight.
138. See, e.g., MODEL RULES pmbl. ("The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special
responsibilities of self-government .... Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers.").
139. Although this Article's focus is on professional decisionmaking, one might also consider whether
professional values trump inconsistent personal values when a lawyer acts in an area of personal rather than
professional discretion. Consider, for example, the lawyer who believes that divorce is immoral. May she
therefore oppose federal funding for lawyers representing indigent clients in divorce actions? May she seek to
persuade lawyers in the community to withdraw from representing clients who seek a divorce? Wholly apart
from First Amendment considerations, a lawyer initially would seem to have absolute personal discretion to
take such steps. It might be argued, however, that the lawyer's advocacy, while motivated by personal
conscience, is morally objectionable when viewed in the context of the professional norms. See, e.g., MODEL
CODE EC 8-3 ("The fair administration of justice requires the availability of competent lawyers.").
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discretion to protect the child by disclosing his confidences in this extreme
situation even over the client's objection. 14 0
Prudence has professional discretion to decide whether to disclose Small's
confidence in order to protect the child from life-threatening harm. Her discretion
is certainly grounded. For example, she is not free to employ just any methodol-
ogy in exercising this discretion. While a lawyer could decide whether or not to
represent a particular client by flipping a coin, it would be improper for Prudence
to decide in an equally arbitrary manner whether to betray Small's confidences. It
would be no better for the lawyer to make this decision on the basis of the
lawyer's self-interest, for example, in order to avoid the public criticism that
might attend one decision or the other if the facts became known. If this is so,
may the lawyer's religious or moral convictions serve as a basis for making this
decision? The bar association committee concluded that no single consideration
may serve as an exclusive factor, because a lawyer must make an individual
decision based on a range of relevant factors.' 4 1 Although the interest in
protecting the client obviously weighs in favor of disclosure, some other
professional values might weigh in the opposite direction, including the interest
in respecting client decisionmaking and concern for preserving a lawyer-client
relationship of trust and confidence. A lawyer would be expected to take account
of all these considerations. May personal moral or religious beliefs that have no
analogue in the professional norms be added to the mix? Or are the only relevant
principles for the exercise of discretion those that can be said to derive from the
legal profession's norms?
William Simon has argued that lawyers should look to "values associated with
140. See N.YC. Bar Assoc. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 1997-2, in The Record of the Assoc.
of the N.Y. Bar, at 435-36 ("A lawyer has latitude to report information concerning child abuse or mistreatment
in the rare case in which the lawyer honestly concludes, after full consideration, that disclosure is necessary to
save the child's life."). The committee cautioned, however, that
"[tihis exception would be appropriately invoked only in the most extreme cases .... [T]he lawyer
would have to take care not to use this implied exception simply as a pretext for overriding what the
lawyer considers to be a client's bad judgment.... [F]urther, the disclosure 'should be no greater than
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose.'
Id. at 436.
141. The opinion explained:
It does not necessarily follow that, because the lawyer is permitted to make disclosure, the lawyer
should invariably disclose a juvenile client's intention to kill or maim himself or another. On the
contrary, EC 4-7 recognizes that "[t]he lawyer's exercise of discretion to disclose confidences and
secrets requires consideration of a wide range of factors." It would generally be inappropriate,
therefore, for a lawyer to decide invariably to reveal client confidences whenever she is permitted to
do so, rather than taking relevant factors into account in making an individual decision. This being so,
a lawyer may not commit herself in advance to revealing a juvenile client's confidences whenever the
child reveals an intention to kill or maim himself or another. And, for a lawyer to advise the child
client that she will invariably do so, when she must in fact exercise individualized discretion in
deciding whether or not to do so, would be impermissibly misleading if the lawyer's purpose is to
apprise the client of the ordinarily applicable scope of lawyer-client confidentiality.
Id. at 440.
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the legal role" 142 as a basis of decisionmaking rather than to common or personal"moral concerns outside the legal system."' 143 He advances this argument not
only when professional discretion is "grounded, ' "44 but also when it would
appear to be unrestricted. Thus, he argues that decisions about whom to represent
should not be entirely personal decisions, but should be based on professional
morality. In particular, he argues that in making this discretionary decision, as in
making others, "[t]he lawyer should take those actions that, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem most likely to promote justice." "45
Simon does not claim, however, that existing professional norms expect
lawyers to rely on professional values to the exclusion of personal ones, but
simply that, as a prescriptive matter, lawyers should do so. 146 Further, with
respect to discretionary decisions that are ungrounded, the existing normative
understanding is to the contrary. The decision of whom to represent (within the
confines of conflict-of-interest rules and other applicable rules) 1 4 7 is the para-
digm of a professional decision that lawyers may make - and, some would say,
should make - based on their personal as well as professional values. Thus, the
Model Rules allow a lawyer to decline to accept a court appointment if "the client
or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the
client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client." 148 To be
sure, this rule can be explained as an exception designed to protect against the
provision of inadequate representation, rather than to facilitate lawyers' reliance
on personal conscience. Still, few would question that, when an individual or
entity seeks to retain a lawyer, the lawyer acts consistently with the professional
norms in refusing to render legal services if the prospective client or the
prospective cause is repugnant, or even mildly offensive, in light of the lawyer's
personal values.
When the lawyer's discretion is grounded, however, the lawyer's reliance on
personal moral and religious considerations in addition to considerations rooted
in the professional norms seems more troublesome. The Model Rules are
ambiguous on this question, as on many others. Its preamble says that "[wlithin
the framework of these Rules many difficult issues of professional discretion can
arise" 14 9 and that "[s]uch issues must be resolved through the exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles under-
lying the Rules."' 50 It is unclear, however, whether the "moral judgment,' 51 to
142. Simon, supra note 9, at 1083-84, 1113.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1083.
145. Id. at 1090, 1135-37.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 21 (discussing limitations on lawyers' right to choose clients).
148. MODEL RULEs Rule 6.2(c).
149. Id. pmbl.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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which the Model Rules refer may be based on personal moral values or only on
professional ones. It is equally unclear whether "the framework of these
Rules" ' 52 and "the basic principles underlying the Rules" 15 3 limit the lawyer's
consideration to professional values (and personal values that may happen to
coincide with professional values).
The answer may depend on what sort of decision is being made and why the
lawyer is afforded discretion to make it. If discretion is intended, in part, to allow
the lawyer to promote her own interests, then it would seem appropriate for the
lawyer to take personal values into account. For example, a lawyer has discretion
to reveal a client's confidence "to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved."' 1 54 Out of personal moral opposition to snitching, a lawyer who is
accused of wrongdoing might properly decline to reveal client confidences in his
defense.
One might argue, in contrast, that when the ethics committee recognized the
discretion of a lawyer in Prudence's position to disclose client confidences, it
expected her to act exclusively for the benefit of the client. In that event,
Prudence's moral opposition to snitching is not relevant to her decision. It is not
implausible, however, to say that the discretion was afforded in part to enable her
to protect or promote her own interests. In particular, the option of reporting
against the client's will is meant in part to enable her to sleep better at night by
acting in a manner that reconciles her professional conduct with her personal
concern for the client's physical welfare. But even on this reading, it seems fair to
say that the lawyer is limited in which personal values she may consider. The rule
contemplates that she may give weight to her personal "ethics of care." 55 It does
not contemplate, however, that she will give weight to personal values unrelated
to concern for the client's welfare. 156
Example Ten: Disclosure (part two)
Hope, a lawyer, is asked to represent Young, a teenage child, in "abuse and
neglect "proceedings. But, she is unwilling to do so unless she can be confident
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(2).
155. Cf SHAFFER, ON BEING CHRISTIAN, supra note 1, at 33 (claiming "that the ethics of care, which are the
ethics of Jews and Christians, have relevance in law offices").
156. Of course, personal values may sometimes be recast in terms of professional norms. For example, in
deciding whether to make disclosure, Prudence would be expected to take into consideration all of the client's
interests, and not only the client's physical well-being (although that would seem to be the most important one).
One of Small's perceived interests may be in preventing harm to his father. Small may understand that, if his
father's conduct is reported, his father may be criminally prosecuted. This may be precisely why Small insists
that Prudence keep his confidence. If that is so, then Prudence properly would give weight to an interest that
coincides with her own moral view. On the other hand, it may turn out that Small has no concern about causing
harm to his father, but simply underestimates the danger to himself or is indifferent to it.
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that she will be able to act in accordance with her personal belief that children
should be protected from harm.
One might argue that a lawyer properly may rely on her personal moral or
religious understandings as long as these understandings are disclosed to the
client at the outset of the representation and the client consents to be represented
in accordance with the lawyer's understandings. 157 Thus, personal values would
have a more robust role than the one described in this Article as long as the client
agreed. The argument fails, however, because professional norms are not always
open to negotiation between lawyers and their clients. Thus, in the above
example, it is questionable whether Faith may ask Young to permit her to disclose
his confidences whenever she believes necessary to protect him from harm.' 58
And even if Faith could seek Young's advance consent, he would, in any event, be
entitled to change his mind.' 59
Other professional norms that limit the lawyer's reliance on personal values
are equally inflexible. For example, it is doubtful whether a lawyer could rely on
a client's consent to receive advice based on the lawyer's personal moral and
religious views where such advice would be incompetent or misleading. Nor
could a lawyer rely on a client's agreement that the lawyer will define the
objectives of the representation in accordance with the lawyer's personal values.
IV. CONCLUSION
All lawyers hold beliefs and values that "are contingent, or are not shared by
others," t60 including by their clients or by other lawyers. On one conception of
the professional norms, conflicts never would arise between lawyers' personal
157. Cf Buice, supra note 122, at 1033 ("If I see my role in divorce cases to be a mediator who brings
warring factions to agreement, ... I may lay down parameters: 'If you hire me, this is the way we will do it.'
Such clarification may be necessary to protect my personal integrity, so that I can live consistently with who I
perceive myself to be and who I want to become. Such a clarification of my role will free me to enter into my
task with my whole heart.").
158. In N.YC. Bar Assoc. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 1997-2, in The Record of the Assoc. of
the N.Y. Bar, at 435-36, 442, the ethics committee considered the question of whether, before committing
herself to represent a child, the lawyer may require a child to consent in advance to the lawyer's disclosure of
information concerning harm threatened by the child's caretaker. The committee answered, in part: "[I]t is
appropriate for the lawyer to seek advanced consent to certain disclosures and it may even be appropriate to
condition the representation on the client's consent. It would not necessarily be appropriate, however, to seek
the client's consent in order to promote interests other than those of the client." Id. In particular, the committee
opined, "[iut would not be appropriate ... to seek to promote the agency's interests by soliciting the client's
consent to disclosures that are likely to be contrary to the client's best interest." Id. The committee also observed
that any consent given by the child must be voluntary and that, "[a]mong other things, the lawyer must consider
whether the child perceives, accurately or not, that in the absence of consent, he will not be able to secure legal
assistance." Id. at 443.
159. Id. at 443-44 ("If the minor client consents in advance to the lawyer's reporting of confidences or
secrets concerning abuse or mistreatment, the client may later change his mind and revoke consent, in which
event the lawyer must maintain confidentiality .... ").
160. Richard A. Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 75 IOWA L. REv. 975, 983 (1990).
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values and professional norms because a lawyer always would be permitted to
obey his or her own conscience. On another, such conflicts would arise at any
time that a lawyer's personal moral or religious understandings were implicated
because the lawyer would be required to exclude personal values from all
professional decisionmaking. Neither conception accurately describes the profes-
sional understandings, however. Personal values do not take the lead in profes-
sional decisionmaking, but neither are they shunted offstage. Instead, personal
conscience plays a supporting role.
On one hand, a lawyer may rely on personal conscience to signal a possible
ethical quandary, draw on personal values to construct a philosophy of legal
practice within the porous construct of professional norms, invoke personal
values (almost) always in making professional decisions that are relegated to the
lawyer's ungrounded discretion, and refer to personal moral considerations in counsel-
ing clients. Thus, the professional norms do not bleach out the lawyer's conscience. 6 '
On the other hand, personal values are sometimes excluded from professional
decisions, including aspects of everyday decisions about how to counsel clients
and how to carry out clients' objectives. This Article offered various examples in
which the professional norms would foreclose lawyers from acting in particular
ways based on personal moral or religious beliefs that lawyers might plausibly
possess, such as that divorce is immoral, 162 that children should revere their
parents, or that people should not snitch on others. Whereas presumed conflicts
between professional norms and common morality often rest on a contested
understanding of the professional norms,'16 3 and particularly on a philosophy of
extreme partisanship, 64 the conflicts described in this Article occasioned by
lawyers' personal moral or religious understandings rested on conservative
readings of the professional norms. Consequently, when their personal values are
implicated in the course of their work, conscientious lawyers face an initial
question of whether the professional norms allow the lawyer to take account of
his or her personal values in making any particular decision. This decision must
be made on an ad hoc basis, because the limits cannot be captured in a formula or
a framework. Personal values are especially likely to be excluded when a
lawyer's professional discretion is grounded. But lawyers may sometimes weigh
personal values in making such decisions and, conversely, lawyers may be
161. A better explanation for why lawyers often do not rely on personal values is simply that it is easier for
lawyers to deal with one set of values at a time. See Wasserstrom, supra note 12, at 29 ("Psychologically, roles
give a great power and security because they make moral life much simpler, less complex, and less vexing than
it would be without them.").
162. See generally, e.g., Muise, supra note 4, at 790-91 (discussing the Catholic view of divorce and its
possible implications for a Catholic lawyer); supra note 28 (discussing Jewish understandings of divorce).
163. See, e.g., supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing differing interpretations of the
professional rules governing confidentiality).
164. See, e.g., Matasar, supra note 160, at 979-80 (noting examples in which morally questionable conduct,
although prevalent in professional practice, is unsupported by the written ethical rules).
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foreclosed from relying on certain personal values in making decisions that are
primarily relegated to a lawyer's unguided discretion. If the professional norms
turn out to conflict with the lawyer's professional values, the lawyer then faces
the question of whether to give priority to personal or professional morality.
The above discussion suggests two additional questions, which this Article
makes no attempt to resolve. First, to what extent should the professional norms
permit a lawyer to obey his or her own conscience? From the limited perspective
of professional morality, the answer may depend in part on two other questions:
first, whether one is satisfied that the professional norms adequately identify the
considerations that ought to influence lawyers' professional decisions or whether
one believes that there are significant gaps that ought to be filled by lawyers'
personal moral beliefs; and, second, whether one believes that lawyers' personal
morality will improve the professional norms or whether one is skeptical about
lawyers' personal moral beliefs. The examples offered in this Article suggest the
difficulty of addressing these questions purely in the abstract. Personal moral and
religious understandings are a double-edged sword; they have the potential either
to ameliorate or to exacerbate the deficiencies of the professional norms. For
example, various features of legal practice "conspire to depersonalize the client
in the eyes of the lawyer qua professional." 165 Some moral and religious values
would inspire lawyers to respect individuals and to take their emotional needs
into account. 166 But other values, if acted upon, would underscore the lawyer's
dominance of the lawyer-client relationship.1 67 From a broader perspective, as
Professor Lesnick discusses, the question of whether the professional norms
should accommodate personal morality depends in part on the extent to which
one believes that a pluralist society should make room for individuals to lead
professional lives in accordance with their moral and religious beliefs. 168 It also
depends on the extent to which one believes, as Susan Kupfer previously argued
in this Journal, "we need to encourage and endorse the development of individual
moral autonomy for lawyers." 169
Second, how should lawyers ultimately respond to conflicts between personal
conscience and professional morality - should conscience trump the profes-
sional norms or vice versa? Lawyers whose personal moral beliefs genuinely
conflict with the professional morality have various alternatives, 170 which in-
165. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTs. 1, 21 (1975).
166. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing how some lawyers exhibit compassion by
just respecting their clients as individuals and listening to their needs).
167. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (discussing the problems that arise when a lawyer
counsels his client based on the lawyer's religious beliefs).
168. Lesnick, supra note 127 (manuscript at 7) (stating that a pluralist society should make a reasonable
space for lawyer's strongly held moral beliefs).
169. Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 33, 41 (1996).
170. See Wolf, supra note 12, at 52 ("A host of situations can be imagined in which the dictates of a lawyer's
professional responsibilities are clear, but with respect to which the question remains whether it is morally good
or even morally permissible for the lawyer to follow these dictates. In such situations, a lawyer must simply (or,
1997]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 11:19
clude avoiding professional settings in which conflicts are likely to arise or, if
doing so is not possible, leaving the profession altogether.171 In the course of
representation, lawyers can make categorical judgments, either always comply-
ing with the professional norms 172 - an alternative that is likely to be particu-
larly unsettling when the norms of the lawyer's professional community conflict
with those of the lawyer's religious community - or always giving priority to a
personal moral or religious belief. 17 3 Or, lawyers can exercise moral judgment in
individual situations. 174
From the perspective of the legal profession, of course, priority ordinarily
would be given to the professional norms.1 75 Conflicts between professional
norms and personal values seem far less troubling than conflicts between
professional norms and common morality. Moral philosophers have argued that
when a professional norm conflicts with common morality, lawyers should
question the appropriateness of the professional norm176 and, presumptively,
should abandon it. 177 The same could not be said, however, when professional
more often, not so simply) take stock of his or her commitments to the profession and to nonprofessional values
and principles, and decide.").
171. See id. at 58 ("There are significant moral tensions between the values a person must uphold if he or she
wants to excel as a lawyer and the values a person with any of a variety of morally praiseworthy ideals may want
his or her life to reflect. These tensions discourage some people from entering and remaining in the legal
profession .... ); supra note 28 (noting Levinson's observation that an Orthodox Jew might be obliged to
refrain from representing criminal defendants).
When individuals are sworn in as members of the bar, they customarily are required to avow that they will
conform to the applicable rules of professional conduct. Insofar an individual anticipates disregarding the
professional rules as a matter of conscience, he or she faces a moral question about whether it is right to enter the
profession under the pretense that he or she will follow the rules. By way of comparison, consider an individual
who had moral objections to the death penalty. One might accept this moral position but conclude that it is
morally wrong for that individual to take a position as an executioner without disclosing this view and then, as a
matter of conscience, for him or her to take steps to ensure that scheduled executions go awry.
172. See, e.g., Postema, supra note 9, at 289-94 (describing cognitive strategies for dealing with "profes-
sional knavery").
173. See generally Judith A. McMorrow, Civil Disobedience and the Lawyer's Obligation to the Law, 48
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 139 (1991) (discussing lawyers' civil disobedience).
174. Cf. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark limes, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 31, 39 (1995) ("Moral decision making requires more than identifying the appropriate principles
and values, and it requires more than analyzing arguments .... Rather, moral decision making involves
identifying which principle is most important given the particularities of the situation, and this capacity is
precisely what we mean by judgment.").
175. The Tennessee ethics opinion discussed by Professor Lesnick is a good example. See supra note 127 for
that opinion.
176. See Williams, supra note 12, at 266-267 (arguing that an important element of legal education should be
to leave lawyers with some moral unease concerning their actions as lawyers).
177. See, e.g., David Wasserman, Should a Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing? David Laban on the Morality
of Adversary Representation, 49 MD. L. REV. 392, 394-404 (1990) (reviewing LUBAN, supra note 9);
Wasserstrom, supra note 12, at 34 ("[T]he burden of argument and proof rests upon those who seek to justify
the differential consideration and treatment of members of the moral community that takes place as a result of
the role-defined reasoning.... [A]t least where important needs and interests are at stake, the universalistic
dimension of morality presumptively requires equality of consideration and treatment in quite a strong sense.").
This view has been contested, however. For example, Susan Wolf points out that one might identify "the
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norms conflict with personal morality, especially when the applicable profes-
sional norms, such as those relating to competence and candor, are not merely
regulatory provisions but themselves have substantial moral content.178 Rather,
the burden in such a case, from the profession's perspective, would be the other
way: because the professional norms embody the professional community's
understanding of what it means to be a good lawyer, 179 they are presumptively
justified and worthy of respect.' 8°
Yet, many lawyers with deeply held moral views would reject the idea that the
legal profession, any more than the client, is the keeper of his or her conscience.
Religious lawyers, in particular, might presume that the values of their religious
community take priority over those of their professional community and dismiss
as "idolatry" the premise that the question of whether to act in reliance on
religious belief is to be decided by professional rulemakers. This might lead to
the conclusion that, in the end, a lawyer should always obey his or her
conscience.
The middle course, that is, exercising moral judgment on an ad hoc basis,
poses the most difficult personal challenge. 181 Much as conflicts between
promotion of truth and justice," wolf, supra note 12, at 46, as a universal moral value, id., but that a lawyer who
made this his "direct, overidding aim," id., and therefore "undermine[d] the legal interests of clients with less
noble legal goals" would not be acting in accordance with the profession's ideal of the good lawyer. Id. at 49.
178. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 47 ("The good lawyer.., gives the client the best professional care
possible subject to the constraints of ordinary morality that apply inside, as well as outside, the context of the
job.").
179. Cf. id. at 40 ("[Llegal ethics... takes as its central focus the study of what ethical principles and virtues
are essential ... to being a good lawyer.").
180. One can envision situations in which, from the profession's perspective, a lawyer would be justified in
disregarding a rule of professional conduct as a matter of personal conscience. For example, lawyers are
forbidden (subject to exception) from providing financial assistance to a client in connection with a pending
litigation. E.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(e) (precluding, subject to two exceptions, lawyers from providing clients
financial assistance in connection with pending litigation); MODEL CODE DR 5-103(B) ("While representing a
client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to
his client .. "). On its face, this rule would forbid providing financial assistance to a client who would
otherwise be evicted from her apartment. However, it might be argued in a disciplinary context that a lawyer
who, acting on a moral or religious conviction, provides financial assistance to an indigent client under these
circumstances should be found to have acted in a professionally proper manner. At least two problems are raised
by recognizing conscientious objection as a justification, rather than simply as a consideration relevant to a
disciplinary agency's exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The first is that disciplinary agencies might then be
put in the position of inquiring into the bonafides of lawyers' asserted moral views. The other is that it might be
difficult to determine when conscientious objection should or should not be a justification for violating a rule.
Violating the rule against financially assisting a client in litigation seems to be a sympathetic candidate for
conscientious objection because the justification for the rule is questionable and because the rule is broader than
necessary to achieve its questionable aims. In contrast, although moral objections might be made to the rule
forbidding a lawyer from deliberately eliciting false testimony, it is inconceivable that a professional consensus
can be achieved for allowing lawyers to violate this rule for moral or religious reasons.
181. See, for example, Edwin Greenebaum, Attorneys'Problems in Making Ethical Decisions, 52 IND. L.J.
627, 630 (1977), in which he writes:
The traditions of the profession do provide rationalizations for those who would abandon their own
judgment to that of the group .... Whatever rationalizations lawyers accept, however, there will
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professional norms and common morality might occasion lawyers to reevaluate
the professional norms, conflicts between professional norms and personal values
might occasion lawyers additionally to reevaluate the relevant personal beliefs;1 82
to determine whether their beliefs are clear, fundamental, and deeply held; and,
ultimately, to make a judgment whether to follow conscience or professional
norms. Subject to considerations of client confidentiality, lawyers might resolve
conflicts of this nature, not in isolation, but through dialogue with concerned
individuals, including nonlawyers, who have varied viewpoints and who are, for
the most part, uninvolved in the dilemma. t8 3
These last questions - whether the professional norms should accommodate
personal conscience and how lawyers should respond when they do not - are
serious and important ones precisely because, as this Article shows, the profes-
sional norms presently do not accommodate personal conscience in all cases.
remain that portion of their personalities [that] holds to notions of goodness which [sic] were learned
as children growing up in a family and in the general community. Coping with the resulting internal
conflicts is a part of every attorney's personal agenda.
The alternative to abandoning one's judgment to that of the group is to learn to acknowledge one's
conflicting personal motivations and to make judgments on explicit recognition and weighing of facts
and values influencing decisions. If this is the path of greater responsibility, however, it is also
potentially one of greater distress, requiring as it does living with insoluble dilemmas .... Attorneys
can never be certain of the moral correctness of their decisions ....
Id.
182. This reevaluation presumably would differ depending on whether the relevant values are non-religious
values, in which case the question is likely to be whether they are appropriate ones, or religious values, in which
case the question is likely to be whether they are correctly understood.
183. In the past, I have advocated resolving problems of legal ethics "though open discourse among
individuals with varied perspectives." Bruce A. Green & Nancy Coleman, Foreword, Ethical Issues in
Representing Older Clients, 62 FoRDHAm L. REv. 961,970-71 (1994) [hereinafter Green & Coleman]; see also
Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How
Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 460, 488 n.139 (1996) ("In the absence of judicial
involvment, another preferable alternative would be to seek consensus among those with various perspec-
tives."). I also have worked to develop frameworks within which such discourse may take place. See, e.g.,
Green & Coleman, supra, at 961 (describing Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients);
Green & Dohrn, supra note 46, at 1281 (describing Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children). Where the ethical conflicts involve competing legal values, it would seem appropriate to resolve
them through dialogue among lawyers, judges, and other professionals who work in legal settings. In the case of
a conflict between professional morality and personal moral or religious views, however, this approach will not
work. As Thomas Shaffer noted in a letter responding to an earlier draft of this Article, this is true "partly
because aggregations of lawyers (official and otherwise) are not communal enough to make it work; and mostly
because aggregations of lawyers are so committed to ruling-class ideology that their answers will be answers
that serve their own interests and the interests of their clients." Letters from Thomas Shaffer to Bruce Green (on
file with the author). Professor Shaffer suggested in a recent article that religious lawyers should deliberate on
their professional questions in small groups of fellow believers. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Maybe a Lawyer Can
Be a Servant; If Not.... 27 TEx. TECH. L. Rv. 1345, 1352-53 (1996) (discussing the possability of lawyers
meeting informally to deliberate about Christian law practice).
